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Abstract 
It is widely assumed that in order to lie, a speaker must at least assert a falsehood. I offer an 
analysis of lying based on the Gricean notion of communicative-intention and show how 
lying through assertion operates. I show that certain recently developed assertion-based 
accounts of lying are either problematic or at least not compelling. In defending an account 
of lying based on communicative-intention, I show how it is possible to lie in ways which do 
not involve assertion and how better to accommodate certain problematic cases than 
competing accounts.  
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1 Introduction  
My thesis is divided into three parts: 
 
Asserting & Lying: 
 
I present Williams' (2002) definition of lying to draw out certain connotations of lying, such 
as deception and assertion. I present my own definition of assertion, which has Grice's 
notion of communicative-intention as its base. I then present Grice's Co-operative Principle 
and Maxims to show how co-operative communication is achieved, generally. I am then able 
to describe how my account of assertion fits within this wider field of co-operative 
communication, demonstrating how speakers come to abuse the speech act of assertion in 
order to lie. I finalise this section by presenting my preliminary Gricean definition of lying.   
 
Bald-Faced lies: 
 
I defend my analysis of lying against the growing literature on so-called ‘bald-faced lies’, 
which are claimed to be cases of lying without the intent to deceive the addressee. The 
reason they are considered to be genuine lies is because they are assumed to be genuine 
assertions.  I show that the account of assertion on which this claim rests is either 
problematic or at least not compelling. (For instance, defenders of bald-lies face difficulty 
distinguishing them from sarcastic remarks, assumptions, jokes, make-believe scenarios, 
etc.) I argue that bald-faced lies are not genuine lies, because they are not genuine assertions. 
In addition, I argue that it is likely that some people have the intuition that bald-faced lies 
are genuine lies because bald-faced lies share normative characteristics with genuine lies, 
though this is not sufficient to class them as genuine lies.  
 
Lying with Implicatures: 
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Sorensen (2012), along with others, claims that all lies are assertions. He argues that you 
cannot lie using conversational implicatures, because conversational implicatures are not said, 
and so are not asserted. However, he argues that you can lie using conventional implicatures, 
because conventional implicatures are said, and so are asserted. I show that Sorensen's 
account of lying with indicative conditionals is flawed, because it depends on Bach's (1999) 
account of conventional implicatures, which misconstrues Grice's original conception of 
conventional implicatures.  I argue that conventional implicatures do not contribute to what 
is said, and so are not asserted. In addition, I argue that Sorensen, along with Adler (1997), 
Carson (2006), Fallis (2009), Saul (2012), and Stokke (2013), are wrong to think that you 
cannot lie using all (or any) implicatures. Instead, I suggest that since the crucial aspect of 
lying is not what is said, but what was communicatively-intended to be believed, all 
implicatures, as well assertions, are sufficient for lying. I adjust my preliminary Gricean 
definition of lying in order to rule-in cases of deception using assertions and implicatures, 
and present my final Gricean definition of lying.  
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2 Asserting & Lying 
 
2.1 The Traditional Definition of Lying 
 
Williams (2002) presents what has come to be known as the traditional definition of lying: 
 
 [A]n assertion, the content of which the speaker believes to be false, which is made 
with the intention to deceive the hearer with respect to that content (Williams (2002: 
96)). 
 
The traditional definition of lying has four necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. A 
must assert that p. For example, you do not lie if you deceive someone into believing that you 
have hair by wearing a wig. A must assert that p to an addressee. For example, you do not lie if 
you deceive someone who is eavesdropping on your conversation, whether you know of 
their presence or not. (Note, it is not necessary that there actually be an addressee, simply 
that you believe that you are asserting that p to an addressee.) A must intend that the addressee 
believe that p. For example, you do not lie if you assume that something false is true for the 
sake of argument or if you tell a joke. A must believe that p is false. For example, you do not lie 
if you say to someone what the time is when you have unknowingly acquired your 
information from a clock that is wrong. The traditional definition of lying seems to capture 
the fundamentals of lying. However, it is only a template, since the details regarding 
deception, content and assertion need to be filled in. 
 
2.2 Deceiving & Misleading  
 
'Deceiving' and 'misleading' are success terms. That is, if A deceives B, then B is deceived, 
and if A misleads B, then B is misled. In both cases, A causes B to believe that p when it is not 
the case that p. The difference between deceiving and misleading is that deceiving 
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necessarily involves intention, whereas misleading does not, necessarily. Therefore, if A 
deceives B, then B is misled. But, if A misleads B, then B is not necessarily deceived: 
 
(M) A misleads B iff A causes B to believe that p when it is not the case that p. 
(D) A deceives B iff A intentionally causes B to believe that p when it is not the case 
that p and A believes that it is not the case that p (Carson (2010: 48)). 
 
Lying, then, is a kind of attempted deception. It is worth mentioning what I take 'cause' to 
amount to in (M) and (D), in order to avoid any hasty objections. Chilsholm and Feehan 
(1977: 144) spell out four different ways in which 'cause' might be interpreted:  
 
(i) A contributes causally toward B acquiring the belief that p. 
(ii) A contributes causally toward B continuing in the belief that p.  
(iii) A contributes causally toward B ceasing to believe in not-p.  
(iv) A contributes causally toward preventing B from acquiring the belief in not-p. 
 
My proposal, here, is that 'cause', when used in (M) and (D), captures interpretations (i) – 
(iv), since it is unnecessary to have separate definitions for each. 
 
2.3 Assertion 
 
To assert something is to perform a certain type of speech act. The question, as MacFarlane 
(2011: 79) puts it, is: "what features of an act qualify it as an assertion, and not some other 
act?" In order to answer this question, we first need to ask another question: what is it that is 
asserted? Answering this second question is more straightforward than answering the first, 
since there is agreement across the board about what the answer is. Grice (1989) explains 
that what is said is "closely related to the conventional meaning of the words (the sentence)... 
uttered” (Grice (1989: 25)). What this amounts to is the truth-conditional content of the 
sentence: a proposition. This is what is asserted. I consider the following formulation of 
sentence meaning, based on Lewis's (1969) account of convention, to best capture this: 
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 Sentence S means that p in language L iff there is a convention among L-utterers that 
S means that p in language L. 
 
Note, what is said is different to saying itself. Cappelen (2011) illustrates this, as follows: 
 
S can be used to express the proposition that there are blind mole-rats in Sweden (call 
this proposition p) because that proposition is its meaning. A speaker of English can 
use S to express p, and that’s what it is to use S to say that p. Of course, you don’t 
need to use a particular sentence, S, to say that p, it can be done in languages other 
than English (and, even, using other sentences of English). One way to do that is to 
say, in some language or other, that there are blind mole-rats in Sweden. If you do 
that, then you have performed a saying, and in so doing you have expressed the 
proposition that p....Contrast this with simply uttering a sentence you don't know the 
meaning of. For those who don't speak Norwegian, try uttering, "De er mange 
svensker som jobber i Oslo." This sentence can be used by those of us who speak 
Norwegian to say that there are many Swedes working in Oslo. Those who don't speak 
Norwegian, can make the sounds, and so utter the sentence, but they cannot use it to 
say that there are many Swedes working in Oslo (Cappelen (2011: 23)). 
 
With this mind, we can give a working definition of saying, as follows: 
 
A says that p iff 
 
 (SY1) A utters sentence S. 
(SY2) S conventionally means that p among L-utterers in language L. 
(SY3) A intends to express p by uttering S. 
 
We have, then, the following necessary conditions regarding assertion: 
 
(i) Asserting entails saying (though not the converse). 
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(ii) 'What is said' only consists of propositional content (i.e. truth-conditional 
content). 
 
It will be obvious to the reader that speakers often say that p without performing what we 
should consider to be an act of assertion. For example, a speaker might say that p in making 
an assumption, a presupposition, being sarcastic, cracking a joke, playing make-believe, etc. 
We are brought back, then, to our first question: what features of an act qualify it as an 
assertion, and not some other act?  
 
2.4  Communicative-Intention  
 
Grice (1989) argues that what individuals mean when they communicate with each other is 
best described in terms of his account of  non-natural meaning (hereafter, MeaningNN). He 
defines MeaningNN in terms of complex psychological states, where the individual intends to 
produce certain psychological states in the addressee: belief and recognition. This has come 
to be known as communicative-intention: 
 
A MeansNN that p iff 
 
(MNN1) A intends that B believe that p. 
(MNN2) A intends that B recognise A's intention. 
(MNN3) A intends that B form the belief that p on the basis (at least in part) of 
recognising A's intention (Grice (1989 : 19)). 
 
This, I believe, is the answer to our first question. (Note, for the sake of brevity, I will 
collapse conditions (MNN1) – (MNN3) into the following condition: A communicatively-
intends that B believe that p.) 
 
2.5 My Gricean Definition of Assertion 
 
I present my Gricean definition of assertion: 
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A asserts that p to B iff 
 
(GDA1) A says that p to B. 
(GDA2) A communicatively-intends that B believe that p. 
 
2.6 The Co-operative Principle and the Maxims 
 
Grice is concerned with the way in which people interact with each other, i.e. how speakers 
and addressees communicate co-operatively. He believes that what enables co-operative 
communication between speakers and addressees are normative principles and maxims. The 
core feature that he observes is the Co-operative Principle: 
 
 Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it 
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are 
engaged (Grice (1989: 26)). 
 
Grice divides the Co-operative Principle into the following Maxims (Grice (1989: 26 – 28)): 
 
Maxim of Quality 
 
The super-maxim: 
 
 Try to make your contribution one that is true. 
 
Specific maxims: 
 
 Do not say what you believe to be false. 
 Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. 
 
Maxim of Quantity 
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 Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the 
exchange). 
 Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. 
 
Maxim of Relation 
 
 Be relevant. 
 
Maxim of Manner 
 
The super-maxim: 
 
 Be perspicuous. 
 
Various maxims: 
 
 Avoid obscurity of expression. 
 Avoid ambiguity. 
 Be brief. 
 Be orderly. 
 
2.7 The Co-operative Principle, the Maxims  & the Significance of 
 Communicative-Intention 
 
If we consider my Gricean definition of assertion in relation to the Co-operative Principle 
and the Maxims, we find a credible explanation regarding the uptake of assertion. Not only 
does the speaker intend that the addressee believe what she says, intend that the addressee 
recognises this, and intend that the addressee form this belief because that is what she 
intends. But also, when the speaker makes her assertion, there are normative principles in 
place whereby she is presumed by the addressee to be saying what she believes to be true 
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and what she has adequate evidence for. This pairing creates traction, and so assists in the 
uptake of her assertion. Faulkner (2007: 899) adds to this by recognising that it is the relation 
between a speaker's intentions and an addressee's recognition of them that invokes trust. An 
interesting aspect of this is that saying what you believe to be true and what you have 
adequate evidence for are not necessary conditions for making an assertion. Speakers, 
then, are in a position to abuse the act of assertion in order to lie. 
 
2.8 Implicature 
 
Grice's investigation includes an account of what he calls implicature. He found that by 
utilising the Co-operative Principle, the Maxims and the conventional meanings of certain 
words themselves, when a speaker says that p, she is able to indicate to an addressee, and so 
implicate to an addressee, a proposition that is additional to, but independent of, what she 
has said. He divides implicatures into three types: conversational implicature, scalar implicature 
and conventional implicature.1 Note, I believe that implicating propositions should also be 
explained in terms of what a speaker MeansNN. That is, the mechanics of implicature differ 
from the mechanics of assertion (as I have presented it), but they share a key component: 
communicative-intention. This means, then, that when a speaker implicates a proposition, 
she determines a specific proposition that she communicatively-intends the addressee to 
believe, though the potential propositions that she can implicate are indefinite. 
 
2.8.1 Conversational Implicature 
 
Conversational implicatures are generated when a speaker says that p and utilises the 
Maxims (either by observing them or not fulfilling them) in order to indicate to an 
addressee, and so implicate to an addressee, something additional to, but independent of, 
what she has said. Grice explains how conversational implicatures are generated, as follows: 
 
                                                          
1 Grice introduces, as terms of art, the verb 'implicate', and the related nouns 'implicature' and' 
implicatum' (plural, 'implicata'). See Grice (1989: 24).   
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He [the speaker] has said that p; there is no reason to suppose that he is not 
observing the maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle; he could not be doing 
this unless he thought that c; he knows (and knows I know that he knows) that I can 
see that the supposition that he thinks that c is required; he has done nothing to stop 
me thinking that c; he intends me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, 
that c, and so he has implicated that c. (Grice (1989: 31)) 
 
He provides the following example: 
 
A is writing a testimonial about a pupil who is a candidate for a philosophy job, and 
his letter reads as follows: "Dear Sir, Mr. X's command of English is excellent, and his 
attendance at tutorials has been regular. Yours, etc." (Gloss: A cannot be opting out, 
since if he wished to be uncooperative, why write at all? He cannot be unable, 
through ignorance, to say more, since the man is his pupil; moreover, he knows that 
more information than this is wanted. He must, therefore, be wishing to impart 
information that he is reluctant to write down. This supposition is tenable only if he 
thinks Mr. X is no good at philosophy. This, then, is what he is implicating) (Grice 
(1989: 33)). 
 
2.8.2 Characteristics of Conversational Implicature 
 
Non-detachability 
 
 If you replace utterance p (which generates a conversational implicature c) with 
another utterance q with the same literal meaning as p, then the same conversational 
implicature c remains (Grice (1989: 31 – 43)). 
 
Cancelability  
 
 If you utter p that generates a conversational implicature c, it is possible to cancel the 
conversational implicature c by adding but not c or I do not mean to implicate that c. 
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Also, utterance p, depending on the context and situation, can be found not to carry 
conversational implicature c (Grice (1989: 31 – 43)). 
 
 
Calculability 
 
 If a conversational implicature c is to be present, then it must be capable of being 
worked out. That is, if it is not possible to infer the conversational implicature c from 
the fact that p was uttered, then c will not count as a conversational implicature 
(Grice (1989: 31 – 43)). 
 
Non-Conventionality 
 
 Conversational implicatures are not generated by the conventionally fixed meaning 
of the words themselves (Grice (1989: 31 – 43)). 
 
2.8.3 Scalar Implicature 
 
Scalar implicatures, generally speaking, are generated when a speaker says that p and 
specifically utilises the Maxim of Quantity in order to indicate to an addressee, and so 
implicate to an addressee, something additional to, but independent of, what she has said. 
Grice considers scalar implicatures to be a kind of generalized conversational implicature, 
whereas he considers the conversational implicatures mentioned above to be of a 
particularized kind (Grice (1989: 37)). He explains that a particularized conversational 
implicature "is carried by saying that p on a particular occasion in virtue of special features 
of the context, cases in which there is no room for the idea that an implicature of this sort is 
normally carried by saying that p" (Grice (1989: 37)). Yet, in cases of generalized 
conversational implicatures "one can say that the use of a certain form of words in an 
utterance would normally (in the absence of special circumstances) carry such-and-such an 
implicature" (Grice (1989: 37)). Nonetheless, the way in which scalar implicatures are 
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generated is essentially the same as the way in which conversational implicatures are 
generated. Consider the following example: 
 
 
 
(S1) Someone has taken the spare tyre out of the boot of the car. 
 
A speaker who says (S1) will be in a position to know whether or not it was them who took 
the spare tyre out of the boot of the car. If an addressee has no reason to suppose that the 
speaker is not observing the Maxim of Quantity, and so is being as informative as required, 
the speaker is implicating the following: 
 
(S1I) It wasn't me who took the spare tyre out of the boot of the car. 
 
(Note, the characteristics of scalar implicature are also similar to those of conversational 
implicatures.) 
 
2.8.4 Conventional Implicature 
 
Conventional implicatures are generated when a speaker says that p and exploits the 
conventional meaning of words within the uttered sentence itself in order to indicate to an 
addressee, and so implicate to the addressee, something additional to, but independent of, 
what she has said. Grice explains how conventional implicatures are generated, as follows: 
 
U’s doing x might be his uttering the sentence “She was poor but she was honest”. 
What U meant, and what the sentence means, will both contain something 
contributed by the word “but”, and I do not want this contribution to appear in an 
account of what (in my favoured sense) U said (but rather as a conventional 
implicature) (Grice (1989: 88)). 
 
To clarify Grice's characterisation, consider (S2) and (S3): 
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(S2) She was poor but she was honest. 
(S3) She was poor and she was honest. 
 
 
Grice explains that (S2) and (S3) are logically equivalent (i.e. they have the same truth-
conditions): (S2) is false if and only if at least one of its conjuncts is false, and (S3) is false if 
and only if at least one of its conjuncts is false. They are both true otherwise. However, if 
you say (S2) instead of (S3), due to the word 'but', you indicate that there is a contrast. By 
exploiting the word 'but' you can generate a conventional implicature. Since the contribution 
of the word 'but' in the uttered sentence and the conventional implicature are not part of 
what is said in (S2) (i.e. not part of the propositional content of (S2)), Grice concludes that 
the contribution of the word 'but', and the conventional implicatures generated by it, have 
no bearing on the truth-conditions of (S2). Here is an example: 
 
(S4) I've had three bowls of porridge but I'm still hungry. 
 
By exploiting the word 'but', a speaker might implicate the following proposition, as follows: 
 
(S4I) I'm surprised that I'm hungry after eating so much. 
 
2.9 My Preliminary Gricean Definition of Lying 
 
Using my Gricean definition of assertion as a base, I present my preliminary Gricean 
definition of lying: 
 
A lies to B iff 
(PGDL1) A says that p to B. 
(PGDL2) A communicatively-intends that B believe that p. 
(PGDL3) A believes that p is false. 
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3 So-Called Bald-Faced Lies 
 
3.1  Setting the Scene: Defenders of Bald-Faced Lies 
 
Carson (2006), Sorensen (2007), Fallis (2009) and Stokke (2013) claim that it is possible to lie 
without the intent to deceive the addressee. These so-called lies are known as bald-faced lies. 
Carson explains as follows: 
 
Sometimes people lie when they know that others know that they are lying. I can lie 
to you in claiming that p, even if I know that you know that p is false and I also know 
that you know that I know that p is false. In such cases, I lie to you, even if I don’t 
intend to deceive you either about the truth of p or about what I believe (Carson 
(2002: 295)). 
 
Defenders of bald-faced lies argue that bald-faced lies are assertions, and so strong 
restrictions must be imposed on what any definition of assertion can entail, and, by 
extension, on what any assertion-based definition of lying can entail. They conclude that any 
definition of assertion, and so any assertion-based definition of lying, that does not comply 
with these strong restrictions must be rejected. It seems, then, that my Gricean definition of 
assertion and my preliminary Gricean definition of lying are in danger of being rejected.2  
 
3.1.1 Example 1: The Witness 
 
                                                          
2 Since these philosophers formulate assertion-based definitions of lying, they necessarily rule-out 
cases of implicature as lies. Instead, they call deceptive implicatures cases of misleading, confusingly.  
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During a court trial, a witness to a crime is called to the stand. The witness knows that the 
crime, and her presence at the scene of the crime, were recorded on a video camera and 
shown to the members of the court. The witness knows that the members of the court know 
that the witness saw the individual commit the crime. And the witness knows that the 
members of the court know that the witness knows that the witness saw the individual 
commit the crime. However, the witness decides to testify that she did not see the individual 
commit the crime, because she is scared that she will be punished by the individual, if she 
testifies that she did.   
 
Lawyer: Did you see the individual commit the crime? 
Witness: No, I did not see the individual commit the crime. 
 
The witness says something she believes to be false, but she does not intend to deceive the 
members of the court (Carson (2001: 289)). 
 
3.1.2 Example 2: The Nurse 
 
During the Iraq war, a journalist sneaks into a civilian hospital. She is surprised to see a 
ward full of wounded soldiers, as this suggests that Iraqi military hospitals are already 
overcrowded. The journalist approaches a nurse. The nurse knows that the journalist knows 
that there are soldiers in the hospital (and that the nurse can see the uniforms). And the 
nurse knows that the journalist knows that the nurse knows that there are soldiers in the 
hospital (and that the nurse can see the uniforms). However, the nurse thinks that it is best 
not to talk to journalists about what is going on in the hospital. 
 
Journalist: How many soldiers have you admitted today?  
Nurse: There are no soldiers here. 
Journalist: But they are wearing uniforms. 
Nurse: I see no uniforms [pushing the journalist out of the hospital]. You must go 
now, do you hear? 
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The nurse says something he believes to be false, but he does not intend to deceive the 
journalist (Sorensen (2007: 256)). 
 
 
 
3.1.3 Example  3: The Host  
 
During a party, a guest is being troublesome. He drank too much before the party and is 
now causing a scene. The host of the party has had enough, and asks the guest to leave. The 
guest complies and walks out with the host to the taxi that has been arranged to pick him 
up. The guest knows that the host knows that it has been unpleasant to have the guest there. 
And the guest knows that the host knows that the guest knows that it has been unpleasant 
to have the guest there. However, the host is a well-mannered individual, and she thinks it 
best to be polite. 
 
Guest: Thank you for having me over to your home.  
Host: That's ok. It was a pleasure to have you here.  
 
The host says something she believes to be false, but she does not intend to deceive the 
guest. 
 
3.2 Going on Record 
 
Defenders of bald-faced lies claim that, in cases such as these, the speaker is lying, regardless 
of the fact that she does not intend to deceive the addressee. They argue that the speaker is 
lying, because the speaker is making an assertion. And they argue that the speaker is 
making an assertion, because the speaker wishes to go on record with what she says to the 
addressee. Going on record has been described as "playing it straight," "looking grave and 
serious" (Carson (2009: 295)), and "defending... propositions by words and deeds" (Sorensen 
(2004: 252)). Although defenders of bald-faced lies share the thought that, in cases such as 
these, the speaker is making an assertion, they each formulate their own assertion-based 
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definitions of lying in attempt to rule-in deceptive-lies and bald-faced lies, and rule-out 
cases that should not be classed as lies. (Note, Carson does not technically give an assertion-
based definition of lying. However, his definition of lying has been developed into an 
assertion-based definition of lying without any significant changes. So, to class Carson's 
definition of lying as assertion-based is acceptable.) 
3.3 Restrictions on Assertion  
 
If you accept that all lies are assertions, and you accept that bald-faced lies are lies without 
the intent to deceive, where the speaker and the addressee mutually-know that what is said 
is believed to be false by the speaker, then there will necessarily be strong restrictions on 
what your definition of assertion can entail. This can be put schematically (where '≠>' 
represents no entailment), as follows: 
 
 (R1) A asserts that p ≠> A intends B to believe that p. 
 (R2) A asserts that p ≠> A intends B to believe that A believes that p. 
 (R3) A asserts that p ≠>A believes that p. 
 (R4) A asserts that p ≠> A knows that p.3 
 
The challenge that defenders of bald-faced lies face, then, is to define what an assertion is in 
broad enough terms to satisfy (R1) – (R4), but in narrow enough terms to rule-out cases that 
are obviously not assertions, and, in turn, not lies.  
 
3.4 Stokke: Assertion & the Common Ground 
 
Stokke (2013) presents the most current and durable assertion-based definition of lying in 
defence of bald-faced lies: the common ground definition of lying. He defines assertion in 
terms of Stalnaker's theory of common ground ((1978); (1998); (2002)). 
 
3.4.1 The Theory of Common Ground 
                                                          
3 This schematic explanation is taken and developed from Stokke (2013: 41) 
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Stalnaker claims that conversations take place and evolve against a background of mutually 
shared information called the common ground. He defines the common ground as the 
presuppositions of the participants of a conversation, and the participants' beliefs about 
those presuppositions. Its purpose is for the participants of conversations to be able to 
communicate successfully and efficiently. For example, consider (PM) and (CC): 
 
 (PM) The Prime Minister of England is in America. 
 (CC) I ate all the cookies in the cookie jar. 
 
For an assertion of (PM) to be felicitous, it needs to be common ground that there is a Prime 
Minister of England. Equally, for an assertion of (CC) to be felicitous, it needs to be common 
ground who the speaker is.  
 
3.4.2 Possible World Semantics 
 
Stalnaker claims that the content of a presupposition is a proposition, and he analyses 
propositions in terms of possible worlds: 
 
A proposition is a function from possible worlds into truth-values (true or false). 
More roughly and intuitively, a proposition is a rule for determining a truth-value as 
a function of the facts of the way the world is. Or, a proposition is a way... of picking 
out a set of possible states of affairs... all those for which the proposition takes the 
value true (Stalnaker (1978: 79)). 
 
His motivation for analysing propositions as a function from possible worlds is that 
propositions are defined by, what he believes to be, their essential function, which is to 
represent the world: 
 
A proposition – the content of an assertion or belief – is a representation of the world 
as being a certain way. But for any given representation of the world as being a 
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certain way, there will be a set of all the possible states of the world which accord 
with the representation – which are that way. So any proposition determines a set of 
possible worlds. And, for any given set of possible worlds, to locate the actual world 
in that set is to represent the world in a certain way. So every set of possible worlds 
determines a proposition (Stalnaker (1978: 79)). 
 
Furthermore, Stalnaker explains that any two assertions or beliefs will represent the world 
as being the same if and only if they are true in all the same possible worlds. He argues that 
if one assumes that representations, which represent the world as being the same way, have 
the same content (i.e. express the same proposition), then there is, what he describes as, a 
"one-one correspondence between sets of possible worlds and propositions" (Stalnaker 
(1978: 79)). He concludes that this correspondence makes it reasonable to use sets of possible 
worlds, or (equivalently) functions from possible worlds into truth-values, to play the role of 
propositions in his theory. 
 
3.4.3 Presupposition and Possible Worlds 
 
Since Stalnaker takes propositions to be functions from possible worlds into truth-values, he 
believes that a speaker's presuppositions should not be represented as a set of propositions, 
but as a set of possible worlds. His motivation for representing the speaker's 
presuppositions in terms of a set of possible worlds is that it describes the conversational 
process in terms of what he believes to be its essential purpose: to distinguish among 
alternative possible ways that things might be (Stalnaker 1978: 85). In other words, it is the 
presuppositions that define the limits of the set of alternative possibilities among which 
speakers intend their expressed propositions to distinguish, whilst it is the purpose of 
expressing propositions to make such distinctions. 
 
3.4.4 The Context Set, the Main Context Set & the Common Ground 
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Stalnaker explains that there is a distinction to be made between what the participants of a 
conversation presuppose individually, what they presuppose collectively and what they 
presuppose mutually (Stalnaker (2002: 716 – 717)).  
 
 
The Context Set 
 
 The Context Set is the set of presuppositions of a single participant of a conversation 
for the purpose of the conversation. 
 
The Main Context Set  
 
 The Main Context Set is the union of Context Sets of the participants of the 
conversation (i.e. everything that is presupposed by all of the participants of the 
conversation individually for the purpose of the conversation).4 
 
The Common Ground 
 
 The Common Ground is the intersection of the Context Sets of the participants of the 
conversation that are mutually shared by the participants of the conversation for the 
purpose of the conversation.  
 
3.4.5 Non-Defective Main Sets & Defective Main Sets 
 
Stalnaker claims that part of the concept of presupposition is that a speaker assumes that the 
members of her audience presuppose everything that she presupposes. Moreover, he claims 
that it is the case, generally speaking, that a speaker's audience does presuppose everything 
that she presupposes.  This means, then, that, generally speaking, the Context Set of each 
participant of the conversation, the Main Set and the Common Ground are identical. 
                                                          
4 The label. 'Main Context Set,' is my own. I added it  for a clearer explanation of the distinction 
between what participants of a conversation  presuppose individually, collectively and mutually. 
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However, Stalnaker notes that it is possible for a speaker to falsely assume that the members 
of her audience presuppose everything that she presupposes, and so it is possible for there 
to be a discrepancy between the Context Set, the Main Set and the Common Ground 
(Stalnaker (2002: 716 – 717)). 
 
Non-Defective Main Context Set 
 
 If all the participants of the conversation share the same presuppositions (i.e. the 
same Context Set), then the Main Set of the conversation is non-defective.  
 
Defective Main Context Set 
 
 If at least one participant of the conversation does not share the same 
presuppositions as the other participants of the conversation (i.e. has a differing a 
Context Set), then the Main set of the conversation is defective. 
 
Stalnaker explains that a defective Main Set is likely to lead to a failure of communication 
between participants of a conversation, because addressees will interpret the purpose and 
content of what is said in terms of their own presuppositions. However, Stalnaker further 
explains that communication is the point of the enterprise, so everyone will have a motive to 
keep the presuppositions the same (Stalnaker (2002: 717)). 
 
3.4.6 Accommodation 
 
Stalnaker claims that a defective Main Set can reveal itself when a speaker says that p, 
thereby shows that she believes that p, the addressee not believe that p, and the addressee 
recognise that the speaker is presupposing that p. He gives the following example. 
 
Alice says to Bob, who is holding his baby daughter, “How old is he?” (Stalnaker 
(2002: 717)). 
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In this case, Bob recognizes that Alice is taking something to be true that he knows to be 
false: it is a baby girl, not a baby boy. The most straightforward response would be for Bob 
to correct Alice. Stalnaker explains that if such a correction is made, then what the 
participants of the conversation each believe will be brought in line with what both 
participants of the conversation are presupposing. 
 
In the first example, he [Bob] might simply say “It’s a girl”, or he might say 
something that shows that he is presupposing that the baby is a girl (“She is ten 
months old.”), requiring Alice to accommodate (Stalnaker (2002: 717)). 
 
However, Stalnaker also explains that if the false presupposition is irrelevant to the 
purposes of the conversation, then at least one of the participants of the conversation might 
decide to ignore it. 
 
[I]f the false presupposition is irrelevant to the purposes of the conversation... Bob 
might decide to ignore the matter, tacitly accepting what Alice is manifestly 
presupposing for the purpose of facilitating communication without disrupting the 
conversation with a distracting correction. That is, Bob accommodates, not by 
coming to believe the false proposition that Alice is presupposing, but by accepting it 
(Stalnaker (2002: 717)). 
 
3.4.7 Common Belief 
 
Stalnaker explains that, on an over-simplified picture, what a speaker presupposes can be 
understood as what she believes to be common belief, and that the common beliefs of the 
participants of a conversation are the beliefs that they share, and that they recognize that 
they share. Therefore, on such a picture, we can understand the common ground to just be 
common belief. Stalnaker gives the following definition of common belief: 
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It is common belief that φ among a group of believers if and only if all believe that φ, 
all believe that all believe that φ, all believe that all believe that all believe that φ, etc 
(Stalnaker (2002: 708)). 
 
However, as we have seen above, Stalnaker shows that it is possible for there to be a 
divergence between what is believed and what is presupposed. He maintains that even 
though it is possible for there to be a divergence between what is believed and what is 
presupposed, and so a divergence between common belief and common ground, the logic of 
common belief is exactly the same as the logic of common ground. In other words, common 
belief is the model for common ground. 
 
3.4.8 Acceptance 
 
Stalnaker defines the common ground in terms of acceptance, rather than belief. Note, 
Stalnaker describes the notion of acceptance differently throughout his work on the common 
ground, which allows for various interpretations. In his most recent work, he describes 
acceptance as a non-factive propositional attitude that is weaker than belief, but which 
includes belief. That is, A accepts that p does not entail that p is true, nor that A believes that 
p. 
 
Acceptance... is a category of propositional attitudes and methodological stances 
toward a proposition, a category that includes belief, but also some attitudes 
(presumption, assumption, acceptance for the purposes of an argument or an 
inquiry) that contrast with belief, and with each other... Belief is the most basic 
acceptance concept: the simplest reason to treat a proposition as true is that one 
believes that it is true (Stalnaker (2002: 716)).5 
 
Stalnaker claims that there are a number of reasons why the participants of a conversation 
might accept that a proposition is true, though not believe that it is true, and so make 
                                                          
5 It is this description of acceptance that Stokke subscribes to for his common ground definition of 
assertion, and so his common ground definition of lying. 
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accommodations for the sake of the conversation. He provides a collection of examples that 
illustrate such cases. 
 
[I]t could be the speaker who is the one doing the accommodating. Perhaps Alice 
knows that the man is drinking Perrier, but believes that Bob believes that it is a 
martini, and so believes that the best way to identify her intended referent is to use 
this description. Perhaps both are accommodating – both truly believing that it is 
Perrier, but both falsely believing that the other believes it is a martini. Or perhaps it 
is mutually recognized that it is not a martini, but mutually recognized that both 
parties are accepting that it is a martini. The pretense will be rational if accepting the 
false presupposition is an efficient way to communicate something true – 
information about the man who is falsely presupposed to be the man drinking a 
martini (Stalnaker (2002: 718)). 
 
3.4.9 The Definition of Common Ground 
 
Stalnaker gives the following definition of common ground using the logic of common belief 
as a model, and adopting the weaker propositional attitude of acceptance in place of belief. 
 
It is common ground that φ in a group if all members accept (for the purpose of the 
conversation) that φ, and all believe that all accept that φ, and all believe that all believe 
that all accept that φ, etc (Stalnaker (2002: 716)). 
 
3.4.10 Stalnaker on Assertion 
 
Stalnaker does not give a definition of assertion as such. Instead, he makes a claim about the 
effect that assertions have. The following, he insists, must be a component or consequence of 
an adequate definition of assertion. 
 
To make an assertion is to reduce the context set in a particular way, provided that 
there are no objections from the other participants of the conversation. The particular 
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way in which the context set is reduced is that all of the possible situations 
incompatible with what is said are eliminated. To put it a slightly different way, the 
essential effect of an assertion is to change the presuppositions of the participants in 
a conversation by adding the content of what is asserted to what is presupposed 
(Stalnaker (1978: 86)). 
 
In other words, for Stalnaker, the essential effect of an assertion is to add the content of what 
is said to the common ground.  
 
3.4.11 Stokke's Common Ground Definition of Assertion 
 
Stokke uses Stalnaker's theory of common ground and his notion of the essential effect of 
assertion to formulate his common ground of assertion. 
 
A asserts that p to B iff 
 
 (CGA1) A says that p to B. 
 (CGA2) A proposes that p is added the common ground (Stokke (2013: 14)). 
 
3.5 Stokke: Lies & the Common Ground 
 
3.5.1 Stokke's Common Ground Definition of Lying 
 
Stokke adds the necessary condition that the asserter believe what she asserts to be false to 
his common ground definition of assertion in order formulate his common ground 
definition of lying. 
 
A lies to B iff 
 
 (CGL1) A says that p to B. 
 (CGL2) A proposes that p is added the common ground. 
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 (CGL3) A believes that p is false (Stokke (2013: 14)). 
 
Note, deceptive lies are straightforwardly explained on Stokke's view. Since belief entails 
acceptance, if A says that p to B with the intention that B believe that p, then A will have 
necessarily proposed that p is added to the common ground. Therefore, A will have lied to B. 
In addition, on Stokke's view, since conversational, conventional and scalar implicatures are 
not said, and so do not satisfy (CGL1), they cannot be used to lie, though he concedes that 
they can be used to deceive.  
 
3.5.2 Bald Faced Lies & The Common Ground 
 
Stokke's common ground definition of assertion, and so his common ground definition of 
lying, are defined in terms acceptance. Acceptance, as discussed above, is most recently 
described by Stalnaker as a non-factive propositional attitude that is weaker than belief, but 
which includes belief. That is, accepting that p does not entail that p is true, nor that the 
addressee believe that p. This is the particular description of acceptance that Stokke utilises 
for his definition of assertion and his definition of lying. It is clear, then, that Stokke's 
common ground definition of assertion satisfies the strong restrictions, (R1) – (R4), 
mentioned above. Let us see how Stokke's common ground definition of lying handles cases 
of bald-faced lies by working through the three examples. 
 
The Witness's utterance: 
 
 (CGL1) Satisfied: the witness says that she did not see the individual commit the  
  crime to the judge. 
 (CGL2) Satisfied: the witness proposes that it be added to the common ground that 
  she did not see the individual commit the crime. 
 (CGL3) Satisfied: the witness believes that she did see the individual commit the  
  crime. 
 
Evaluation according to Stokke's account: the witness is lying. 
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The Nurse's utterance: 
 
 (CGL1) Satisfied: the nurse says that there are no soldiers in the hospital to the  
  journalist. 
 (CGL2) Satisfied: the nurse proposes that it be added to the common ground that 
  there are no soldiers in the hospital. 
 (CGL3) Satisfied: the nurse believes that there are soldiers in the hospital.6 
 
Evaluation according to Stokke's account: the nurse is lying. 
 
The Host's utterance: 
 
 (CGL1) Satisfied: the host says that it was a pleasure to have the guest at the party to 
  the guest. 
 (CGL2) Satisfied: the host proposes that it be added to the common ground that it 
  was a pleasure to have the guest at the party. 
 (CGL3) Satisfied: the host believes that it was not a pleasure to have the guest at the 
  party.   
 
Evaluation according to Stokke's account: the host is lying. 
 
On Stokke's account, (CGL1), (CGL2) and (CGL3) are satisfied in all three cases, and so the 
witness, the nurse and the host are all lying. The central point is that (CGL2) is satisfied (i.e. 
the witness, the nurse and the host are proposing to add what they have said to the common 
ground). Stokke maintains, then, that the notion of going on record with what is said is 
plausibly explained in terms of the common ground. In other words, to say that the witness, 
                                                          
6 Note, the same evaluation would be made for the second of the nurse's utterances:  
 
 (CGL1) Satisfied: the nurse says that she sees no uniforms. 
 (CGL2) Satisfied: the nurse proposes that it become common ground that she sees no  
  uniforms.  
 (CGL3) Satisfied: the nurse believes that she does see uniforms. 
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the nurse and the host want to go on record, is just to say that they each propose what they 
have said to be added to the common ground. 
 
 
 
3.5.3 Sarcasm & the Common Ground 
 
Sarcasm is a potential source of counterexample to Stokke's common ground definition of 
lying. If someone says something that is mutually-known to be false, then sarcastic remarks 
seem dangerously similar to bald-faced lies on Stokke's account. Fallis presents the 
following example: 
 
In one memorable scene [from Star Wars], our heroes use the garbage chute to escape 
from the detention block of the Death Star. But once they land in the garbage, Han 
Solo sarcastically says: 
 
The garbage chute was a really wonderful idea. What an incredible smell 
you’ve discovered! 
 
He is trying to communicate something that he believes to be true...But he is certainly 
saying something that he believes to be false (Fallis (2009: 53)).  
 
Stokke claims that the common ground definition of lying can easily distinguish between 
bald-faced lies and sarcastic remarks. He explains, as we have seen, that when someone 
bald-faced lies, they propose to update the common ground with what they say. However, 
he explains that when someone makes a sarcastic remark, they do not propose to update the 
common ground with what they have said. Instead, they propose to update the common 
ground with what they have implicated. We can run this idea through Stokke's common 
ground definition of lying, as follows: 
 
Han Solo’s utterance: 
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 (CGL1) Satisfied: Han Solo says that the garbage chute was a wonderful idea. 
 (CGL2) Not satisfied: Han Solo does not propose that it be added to the common  
  ground that the garbage chute was a wonderful idea.  
 (CGL3) Satisfied: Han Solo believes that the garbage chute was a bad idea. 
 
Evaluation according to Stokke's account: Han Solo is not lying. 
  
Stokke argues that in this case (CGL1) and (CGL3) are satisfied, but (CGL2) is not, and so 
Han Solo is not lying. Han Solo says something that he believes to be false, but he does not 
propose to update the common ground with what he says. Instead, he proposes to update 
the common ground with what he has implicated, namely, that the garbage chute was not a 
wonderful idea, but a bad one. In other words, Han Solo is not asserting the proposition he 
proposes to add to the common ground, instead he is implicating it.7 
 
3.5.4 The Official and the Unofficial Common Ground 
 
Stokke is aware that his common ground definition of lying is in danger of ruling-in certain 
other cases that we should not consider to be lies. For example, as mentioned above, 
participants of a conversation will often say mutually-known-to-be false propositions when 
they make assumptions, propound proofs, crack jokes and perform plays. This potential 
danger is apparent because the common ground is defined in terms of the weak notion of 
acceptance, rather than the stronger notion of belief. Therefore, these propositions are also 
proposed to become part of the common ground, and so, it seems, will be considered to be 
lies on Stokke's account. In an attempt to bypass this potential danger, Stokke capitalizes on 
a comment made by Stalnaker regarding assumption and the common ground: 
 
                                                          
7 Stalnaker presents a more abstract way of understanding sarcasm in terms of the common ground.  
When someone says that p in order to implicate q, in cases where q is incompatible with p, it can only 
be q that gets added to the common ground, not p, and not p and q. Since, it is impossible for p and q 
to both be added to the common ground, as p and q contradict each other. Contradictions would 
cause the common ground to explode, logically speaking (Stalnaker (2014: personal correspondence)). 
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One may make assumptions, and what is assumed may become part of the common 
ground, temporarily. (Stalnaker (2002: 704)). 
 
Stokke claims that because assumptions are merely temporarily added to the common 
ground, this indicates that there must be different types of common ground used for 
different purposes. He introduces a distinction between, what he calls, official common ground 
and unofficial common ground. He explains, as follows: 
 
When an assumption is made, a temporary common ground is opened up in which 
the information used for the purpose of the argument is stored (Stokke (2013: 54)). 
 
Stokke argues, then, that some mutually-known-to-be false propositions, such as proofs, 
jokes, plays, and assumptions, among others, are added to an unofficial common ground, 
not to the official common ground. His plan is to completely separate bald-faced lies from all 
other mutually-known-to-be false propositions that we do not consider to be lies. He 
provides two examples to try to motivate this picture. The first example is that of actors on 
stage performing a play. Consider the following: 
 
Imagine we are witnessing the performance of a play set in a monarchy. We are in 
the middle of an intense scene, where, after the exit of her husband, the hero is 
declaring his love for the heroine. Indexicals are being used in lines such as, “I love 
you”. And presuppositions are being invoked by utterances involving “the King”. 
Without even thinking about it, we are taking these indexicals to refer to the 
characters in the play, which suggests that the common ground we are using to 
evaluate these utterances is one that corresponds to the reality of the play. And 
similarly, we are resolving presuppositions by using this common ground of the 
play. Suppose now that in the middle of this scene, the cuckolded husband suddenly 
bursts in, runs to the edge of the stage and shouts in a distressed tone of voice, 
 
Ladies and gentlemen! I have just received word that the President has been 
shot! 
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Most likely, we will all take this utterance to express the proposition that the actor 
has just received word that the (real) President has been shot. In particular, we will 
not be puzzled by the fact that there is no president in the play. And we will take I to 
refer to the actor, not the character he was playing a few minutes ago (Stokke (2013: 
55 – 56)). 
 
Stokke argues that in this case there are two common grounds operative at the same time: 
the unofficial common ground, in which information about the play and the characters, 
including presuppositions, indexical content, location and events, is stored, and the official 
common ground, in which information about the actual world, the actors on stage and the 
audience, also including presuppositions, indexical content, location and events, is stored. 
The second example is that of a politician who gets her speeches mixed up at two separate 
banquets. Consider the following: 
 
A politician is invited to give a humorous speech at a festive banquet and a serious 
speech at a formal banquet. She confuses the dates, and ends up delivering the 
humorous speech at the formal banquet and the formal speech at the festive banquet. 
Take the first event. Suppose that during the humorous speech the politician tells a 
story about the President having “broken wind” during a meeting with some 
ambassadors. The politician knows that this event did not actually happen and is 
only relating it to make a joke. The common verdict on this case is that the politician 
is not lying. She was only joking, although her audience was expecting something 
else. Now consider the second event. Suppose that during the speech she says 
something she knows to be false, say that the President withheld important 
information (Stokke (2013: 52)). 
 
Stokke argues that when the politician says that the President broke wind, she proposes to 
update the unofficial common ground, whereas when the politician says that the President 
withheld important information, she proposes to update the official common ground. What 
is important, here, is which common ground the politician is proposing to add what she said 
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to. Stokke concludes that such cases as assumptions, proofs, jokes, and plays, are added to a 
common ground, but not the relevant common ground. And so, this is what distinguishes 
them from bald-faced lies. The precise formulation of the common ground definition of 
lying, then, is as follows: 
 
3.5.5 The (Official) Common Ground Definition of Lying 
 
A lies to B iff 
 
 (CGL1') A says that p to B. 
 (CGL2') A proposes that p is added to the official common ground. 
 (CGL3') A believes that p is false. 
 
3.6 My Beef with Stokke 
 
3.6.1 The Problem with Acceptance 
 
The notion of acceptance is key to Stalnaker's theory of common ground, and so it is key to 
Stokke's common ground definition of lying. However, as mentioned above, the notion of 
acceptance is described differently throughout Stalnaker's work, and so allows for various 
interpretations. In addition, as mentioned above, in his most recent work, Stalnaker 
describes acceptance as a non-factive propositional attitude that is weaker than belief (i.e. 
believing is one way of accepting). That is, A accepting that p does not entail that p is true, 
nor that A believes that p. This is the description of acceptance that Stokke subscribes to for 
his common ground definition of assertion, and so his common ground definition of lying.  
 
Kölbel (2011), like Stokke, develops a common ground definition of assertion. Note, 
however, in developing his common ground definition of assertion, Kölbel does not 
consider lying, let alone bald-faced lying. Yet, he does notice that Stalnaker's notion of 
acceptance is described differently throughout his work, and so allows for various 
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interpretations. In an attempt to formulate his common ground definition of assertion, 
Kölbel presents two plausible interpretations of acceptance. 
 
The first interpretation Kölbel offers is that acceptance is a propositional attitude concept, of 
which belief is the most basic and fundamental instance. Acceptance, then, includes belief, 
presupposition, presumption, postulation, assumption, supposition and speculation. Kölbel 
explains that this suggests that the propositional attitude of accepting a proposition could be 
explicated disjunctively as, "believing, presupposing, presuming, postulating, assuming, 
supposing, speculating, etc." (Kölbel (2011: 58 – 59)). The second interpretation Kölbel offers 
is that acceptance is not a propositional attitude at all, but, instead, a public or social attitude 
or commitment, governed by the rules or conventions of some social practice, which counts 
the participants of the conversation as committing themselves to the truth of a proposition 
for the purpose of the conversation, without believing that it is true (Kölbel (2011: 59)). 
 
Kölbel, here, inadvertently shows us something problematic about Stokke's common ground 
definition of lying. Stokke argues that when a speaker bald-faced lies, she proposes to add 
her mutually-known-to-be false proposition to the common ground. Since the common 
ground is defined in terms of acceptance, this means that the speaker proposes that her 
proposition be accepted. But what is it for a proposition to be accepted? Stokke's answer to 
this question is found in the first of Kölbel's interpretations. However, this raises a serious 
problem for Stokke. If acceptance can be explicated disjunctively, then it is quite clear which 
disjunct deceptive-lies fall under (i.e. belief). But, it is not at all clear which disjunct bald-
faced lies fall under, since it cannot be belief, presupposition, presumption, postulation, 
assumption, supposition or speculation. If Stokke wishes to hold on to the notion that when 
a speaker bald-faced lies that she proposes to add her mutually-known-to-be false 
proposition to the common ground, when, on his view, acceptance is nothing more than a 
laundry list of propositional attitudes, then he must show exactly which disjunct on that 
laundry list bald-faced lies fall under. Stokke, however, does not show which propositional 
attitude bald-faced lies fall under, and it is not clear that he can.  
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I conclude that until Stokke can show which propositional attitude bald-faced lies fall under, 
he must abandon the first interpretation of acceptance and, instead, subscribe to the second, 
as Kölbel does.  
 
 
 
3.6.2 The Problem with the Unofficial Common Ground 
 
Stokke's conception of the official and unofficial common ground is seemingly compatible 
with the second interpretation of acceptance that Kölbel has on offer. As we have seen, 
Stokke's aim is to distinguish bald-faced lies from all other mutually-known-to-be-false 
propositions said in conversation that we should not consider to be lies. According to 
Stokke, the former are proposed to be added to the official common ground, whereas the 
latter are proposed to be added to an unofficial common ground. Stokke claims that we have 
evidence that a proposition is part of an unofficial common ground, rather than the official 
common ground, because a proposition added to an unofficial common ground is 
unproblematically revocable. 
 
[A]ssertions...added to an unofficial common ground can later be unproblematically 
revoked. For example, suppose that, after the politician has given her humorous 
speech, someone charges her with having lied. She can defend herself by saying, 
 
No, no, you didn’t realize that I was just joking. 
 
And although the politician will be expected to apologize for having made this 
mistake, she is not obviously reproachable for having lied (Stokke (2013: 23)). 
 
Stokke claims that the parallel is not the case for cases like the witness in the court room.  
 
If later charged with lying, she cannot claim to have merely been joking, speaking 
unseriously, or the like. In particular, note that even though [she] can admit later on 
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that she only said what she said in order not to get punished, someone can equally 
well point out that, even so, she lied (Stokke (2013: 23 – 24)). 
 
There are a number of problems that arise from Stokke's conception of unofficial common 
ground, and the way in which it is designed to distinguish bald-faced lies from other cases. 
Note, Stokke says that the unproblematic revocability of a proposition is evidence that the 
proposition is part of an unofficial common ground and that a proposition is part of an 
unofficial common ground because it is unproblematically revocable. Therefore, what 
Stokke seems to be saying is that a proposition is added to an unofficial common ground if 
and only if the proposition is unproblematically revocable. 
 
First, it is not clear what governs unproblematic revocability. If Stokke is arguing that when 
a speaker says that p, when it is mutually-known that p is false, and she can plausibly deny 
that she has lied, making p unproblematically revocable, then Stokke's notion of 
unproblematic revocability seems to be governed by the plausibility of a speaker denying 
whether she has lied or not. The problem is that this is what the notion of unproblematic 
revocability is supposed to establish. That is, we want to be able to determine whether it is 
plausible for a speaker to deny that she has lied or not based on whether p is 
unproblematically revocable or not. But whether p is unproblematically revocable or not is 
determined, then, by whether the speaker has lied or not. Stokke's notion of unproblematic 
revocability seems to be circular. Alternatively, if Stokke is arguing that when a speaker says 
that p, when it is mutually-known that p is false, that there is something else governing 
whether p is unproblematically revocable or not, and so is part of either an unofficial 
common ground or the official common ground, then very well. The problem is that Stokke 
has not provided us with that. The way that the concept of the unofficial common ground is 
designed to distinguish bald-faced lies from other cases, like assumptions, jokes, make-
believe, etc. seems arbitrary. 
 
Second, it is not clear how the notion of unproblematic revocability is supposed to work 
across diverse cases. Consider, again, the cases of the witness, the nurse and the host. Due to 
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the different environments that the speakers are in, and so the different contexts they are 
conversing within, as well as the different conventions that will inevitably be in place, what 
governs unproblematic revocability seems like it is going to be drastically different across 
these three cases. For example, although there might be a problem in regards to the witness 
in the courtroom revoking her false testimony, it is not obvious, at least, that there is a 
problem regarding the host revoking her polite gesture to her insufferable guest. Hawley 
illustrates this point in the following way: 
 
Maybe [giving testimony] has more of a performative aspect (like saying 'I do' 
during a wedding), i.e. it has extra significance for actually being said in the 
courtroom under oath as opposed to on another occasion. That seems compatible 
with it having very serious consequences, including being prosecuted (Hawley (2014: 
personal correspondence)). 
 
Third, as mentioned above, Stokke argues that individuals, such as the witness in the 
courtroom, can be classed as lying, because they cannot claim to have merely been joking, 
speaking unseriously, or the like. But lying or joking do not seem to be the only options on 
offer. For example, when the witness says, "No, I did not see the individual commit the 
crime," Stokke could present his argument to her, and the witness could plausibly respond 
by saying, "No, I did not lie, since I did not intend to deceive anybody. I simply gave false 
testimony." 
 
Fourth, it seems possible for propositions to be unproblematically revoked from the official 
common ground. For example, participants of a conversation will sometimes lie to the other 
participants, if only temporarily, for the sake of playing tricks on them. In such cases, it is 
quite normal for the liar to reveal the lie to the participant and enjoy the look on the other 
participants' faces when they realise that they have been deceived. In this case, is not clear 
that what the liar said is problematically revocable, since it was just a bit of fun, and that 
would be understood by the other participants. Indeed, they might (and usually do) share in 
the fun. (Note, I am not disputing whether or not this is actually a case of lying or not, as I 
think it clearly is. Stokke, on the other hand, might conclude that it is not. If so, I think that 
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would be a particularly unattractive route to take.) This seems to show that it is not the case 
that a proposition is added to an unofficial common ground if and only if the proposition is 
unproblematically revocable, because it is not necessarily the case that if a proposition is 
unproblematically revocable, that it is part of an unofficial common ground.  
 
I conclude that until Stokke clarifies what governs his notion of unproblematic revocability, 
his common ground definition of lying has no credible way of ruling-out cases that we 
should not consider to be lies.  
 
3.6.3 The Problem with Going on Record 
 
Stokke claims, along with other defenders of bald-faced lies, that, in cases such as the 
witness, the nurse and the host, the speaker is lying, regardless of the fact that she does not 
intend to deceive the addressee. He argues that the speaker is lying, because the speaker is 
making an assertion. And he argues that the speaker is making an assertion, because the 
speaker wishes to go on record with what she says to the addressee. Stokke concludes that to 
say that the witness, the nurse and the host want to go on record, is just to say that they each 
propose what they say to be added to the common ground. The problem with this is that it is 
not clear what happens when speakers go off record, as they regularly do. For example, 
speakers sometimes request to go off record when they are speaking to lawyers, journalists, 
doctors, etc., because they do not want what they have said to go on record. It seems that 
Stokke has two options here, neither of which are much use to him. Before I present the two 
options, note that Stokke says that the notion of going on record distinguishes which 
propositions are added to the official common ground and which propositions are not. 
Therefore, what Stokke seems to be saying is that a speaker goes on record if and only if the 
speaker proposes what she says to be added to the official common ground. First, he could 
argue that when a speaker goes off record with what she says, she is operating exclusively 
within an unofficial common ground. If he argues this, then it is clearly possible to lie 
(deceptively or bald-facedly) within an unofficial common ground. Second, he could argue 
that when a speaker goes off record with what she says, she is still operating exclusively 
within an official common ground. If he were to argue this, then it is not the case that a 
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speaker goes on record if and only if the speaker proposes what she says to be added to the 
official common ground, because it is not necessarily the case that when a speaker adds 
what she says to the official common ground, that she goes on record.  
I conclude that Stokke's account of going on record is muddled, and so is not plausibly 
explained in terms of the common ground, as he presents it. (Note, all defenders of bald-
faced lies who hinge their arguments on the notion of going on record are going to have 
difficulty explaining what is going on when a speaker goes off record.) 
 
3.7 Kölbel & the Common Ground 
 
Kölbel, as mentioned above, defines assertion in terms Stalnaker's theory of the common 
ground. He agrees with Stalnaker and Stokke that the essential effect of assertion is to add 
what is said to the common ground. In addition, he agrees with Stalnaker and Stokke that 
there are other speech acts that will inevitably share this essential effect, which should not be 
classed as assertions. However, unlike Stokke, he does not subscribe to the conception of the 
official and unofficial common ground.  
 
Kölbel claims that the participants of a conversation acquire certain rights and undertake 
certain obligations, just by being participants of a conversation. He argues that assertions 
have normative consequences, and that by making an assertion, the assertor implies certain 
obligations on herself. In addition, he argues that the obligations that assertions imply on the 
assertor are what distinguish assertions from other speech acts.8 Drawing on the work of 
Stalnaker ((1978); (1998); (2002)) and the work of Brandom ((1983); (1994)), Kölbel defines 
assertion in terms of the common ground and the obligation of justification. 
 
According to Brandom (1983: 646 – 647), asserting that p has two rules: 
 
 (B1) The asserter incurs a justificatory responsibility, i.e. the obligation to justify his 
 or her assertion if challenged.  
                                                          
8 Kölbel maintains that we must allow for a good deal of variation in whether or not and how these 
obligations are enforced in different kinds of conversation. 
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 (B2) The other participants of the conversation obtain the license to rely on the 
 assertion as a premise - in particular the license to defer to it when themselves 
 justifying assertions.  
 
Kölbel attempts to capture these two rules in a simplified form. He argues that the license to 
rely on someone else’s assertion is just an aspect of the asserter’s obligation to justify it. He 
illustrates this with the following example: 
 
Suppose Sally has told Peter that the shop is open. In what sense does this “license” 
Peter to rely on Sally’s assertion for justification? If Peter himself asserts that the shop 
is open and is asked for justification Peter can say: “Sally said so." If Sally has a 
decent reputation as an informant, this will usually be good enough. For suppose 
someone were to challenge Peter’s justification by uttering “So? What if Sally said 
it?” In that case Peter can say that Sally usually has good reasons for what she asserts 
or that she is reliable in these matters and doesn’t lie etc. The only way for the 
challenger to carry on challenging is either to refuse to accept that she usually has 
good reasons etc. (which may be difficult for him), or she’ll have to refuse to accept 
that Sally’s good reasons etc. are sufficiently good reason for accepting that the shop 
is open. In the latter case, the challenger will, in many ordinary contexts, appear un-
cooperative, unless she has some special reason for denying that Sally’s reasons are 
good enough in this case (in which case it is now the challenger who is taking on 
new justificatory responsibilities). It might be objected that this story depends on the 
assumption that Sally “has a decent reputation as an informant.” It is of course true 
that the story depended on this, and that the amount of weight Peter should be 
prepared to put on Sally’s testimony should depend precisely on her reputation as an 
informant. But of course if Sally didn’t have a good reputation then it is hard to see 
what license would result from her asserting that the shop is open (Kölbel (2011: 67 – 
68)). 
 
Kölbel, then, proposes to capture Brandom’s two rules in the following simplified form: 
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 (K1) If a participant asserts that p then she thereby undertakes the obligation to 
 justify p upon request (Kölbel (2011: 68)). 
 
Taking Kölbel's considerations of Stalnaker's theory of the common ground and Brandom's 
account of the obligation of justification, we are able to formulate Kölbel's common ground 
definition of assertion. 
 
3.7.1 Kölbel's Definition of Assertion 
 
A asserts p iff 
 
 (KA1) A says that p 
 (KA2) p is added to the common ground9 
 (KA3) A undertakes the obligation to justify p upon request 
 
In just the same way as Stokke does, we can add the necessary condition that the asserter 
believe what she asserts to be false to Kölbel's common ground definition of assertion, in 
order to formulate a Kölbelean common ground definition of lying. 
 
3.7.2 The Kölbelean Definition of Lying 
 
A lies to B iff 
 
 (KL1) A says that p to B. 
 (KL2) p is added to the common ground. 
 (KL3) A undertakes the obligation to justify p upon request. 
                                                          
9 I have adapted the necessary condition regarding adding p to the common ground for Kölbel's 
definition of assertion for the following reason: "I do not think that assertion can be reduced to the 
asserter's intentions. It's a social activity that is governed by rules. Hence, if you are a participant of a 
conversation, your utterances of certain sentences will count as assertions no matter what you intend" 
(Kölbel 2014: personal correspondence). Unlike Stokke, Kölbel claims that adding a proposition to the 
common ground does not depend on any intention or proposal of the speaker. It is not necessary for 
me to explore this any further here, but the reader may want to follow it up. See Kölbel (2011). 
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 (KL4) A believes that p is false. 
 
Note, deceptive lies are straightforwardly explained on this Kölbelean account as well. 
Again, since belief entails acceptance, if A says that p to B with the intention that B believe 
that p, then p will necessarily be added to the common ground. Therefore, A will have lied to 
B. In addition, on this Kölbelean view, since conversational, conventional and scalar 
implicatures are not said, and so do not fulfil (KL1), they cannot be used to lie, though they 
can be used to deceive.  
 
3.7.3 The Kölbelean Definition of Lying: Bald-faced Lies 
 
Kölbel's common ground definition of assertion, and so the Kölbelean common ground 
definition of lying, are defined in terms of acceptance. Acceptance, as discussed above, is 
now interpreted not as a propositional attitude, but as a public or social attitude or 
commitment, governed by the rules or conventions of some social practice. It is clear, then, 
that the Kölbel's definition of assertion satisfies the strong restrictions, (R1) – (R4), 
mentioned above. For the sake of brevity, I shall not show how the Kölbelean common 
ground definition of lying handles the cases above, but the reader can verify this for herself. 
To help understand the Kölbelean account, the reader may want to use the following as a 
guide. The general idea, regarding the three cases, is that (KL1), (KL2), (KL3) and (KL4) are 
all satisfied, and so each speaker is lying. The central point is that not only that (KL2) is 
satisfied, but that (KL3) is satisfied (i.e. they have not only added what they have said to the 
common ground, but they have also undertaken an obligation to justify what they have said 
upon request). Note, although they have undertaken an obligation to justify what they have 
said upon request, they may not and, perhaps, cannot comply with this obligation, due to 
what the addressee already knows. Nonetheless, Kölbel claims that (KL3) is still satisfied, 
since they have undertaken a conditional obligation to justify what they have said upon 
request (Kölbel 2014: personal correspondence).  
 
3.7.4 The Kölbelean Definition of Lying: Bald-faced Lies vs. Assumptions 
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The Kölbelean common ground definition of lying, like Stokke's, is in danger of ruling-in 
certain cases that we should not consider to be lies. Again, for example, participants of a 
conversation will often say mutually-known-to-be false propositions when they make 
assumptions, propound proofs, crack jokes and perform plays. This potential danger is 
apparent, as we have seen, because the common ground is defined in terms of acceptance, 
rather than belief. Therefore, these propositions are also added to the common ground, and 
so it seems, will be classed as lies on the Kölbelean account. However, using the Kölbelean 
definition, we need not subscribe to the conception of the official and unofficial common 
ground in order to distinguish lies from other cases. Instead, Kölbel offers an alternative 
strategy which, like Stokke's, is based on a comment made by Stalnaker regarding 
assumption. Recall that Stalnaker says the following: 
 
One may make assumptions, and what is assumed may become part of the common 
ground, temporarily. (Stalnaker (2002: 704)). 
 
Kölbel claims that what distinguishes assertions from assumptions is twofold. First, he 
explains that assumptions do not involve the justificatory obligations involved in asserting. 
He argues that there may be an issue as to whether or not it is useful to assume something in 
particular, but the participant of the conversation making the assumption does not have the 
obligation to provide any justification. Second, he explains that assumptions have an expiry 
date. He argues that at the time of adding the assumed proposition to the common ground, 
participants have already agreed to drop the assumption once they have concluded their 
exploration. Again, to help understand this, the reader may want to use the following as a 
guide. The general idea regarding cases of assumption is that (KL1), (KL2), and (KL4) are all 
satisfied, but (KL3) is not, and so assumptions are not lies. The central point is that although 
(KL2) is satisfied, as Stalnaker claims, (KL3) is not satisfied (i.e. when you make an 
assumption, you add what you say to the common ground, but you do not undertake an 
obligation to justify what you have said upon request). In addition, if this is the case, what 
you have said will have an expiry date, which will be agreed when the assumption is made. 
It is plausible, then, that a defender of the Kölbelean common ground definition of lying 
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could roll this strategy out across other problematic cases, like propounding proofs, cracking 
jokes and performing plays.10  
 
I conclude that I have presented a plausible definition of lying in defence of bald-faced lies, 
as an alternative to Stokke's less credible definition of lying.  
 
3.8 Bald-Faced Lies Are Not Lies 
 
Assertion, as I consider it, is a speech act that has communicative-intention as its base. As we 
have seen, this makes assertion a somewhat penetrative act; in that, when a speaker makes 
an assertion, she intends to affect the beliefs of her addressee, intends for the addressee to 
recognise this, and intends for this to happen based (at least in part) on the addressee's 
recognition of her intention, thus invoking trust between them. That being said, I am 
sympathetic to some of Stalnaker's, Stokke's and Kölbel's notions. That is, I think that the 
theory of common ground is attractive; I think that adding a proposition to the common 
ground is an essential effect of assertion; I think that there generally are certain obligations 
of justification on speakers when they make assertions. However, I do not think that any of 
these play a constitutive role in assertion, only an evidential one. Consider, again, my 
preliminary Gricean definition of lying, which consists of my Gricean definition of assertion, 
and so has communicative-intention as its base: 
 
A lies to B iff 
 
 (PGDL1) A says that p to B. 
 (PGDL2) A communicatively-intends that B believe that p. 
 (PGDL3) A believes that p is false. 
  
With this in mind, let us take another look at the three examples. 
 
                                                          
10 It is obvious that Kölbel's definition of assertion, and so the Kölbelean definition of lying, will 
handle cases of sarcasm in the same way that Stokke does.  
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The Witness's utterance: 
 
 (PGDL1) Satisfied: the witness says that she did not see the individual commit the 
  crime to the judge.  
 (PGDL2) Not satisfied: the witness does not communicatively-intend that the judge 
  believe that she did not see the individual commit the crime. 
 (PGDL3) Satisfied: the witness believes that it is false that she did not see the  
  individual commit the crime. 
 
My evaluation: the witness is not lying. 
 
The Nurse's utterance: 
 
 (PGDL1) Satisfied: the nurse says that there are no soldiers in the hospital to the  
  journalist.  
 (PGDL2) Not satisfied: the nurse does not communicatively-intend that the journalist 
  believe that there are no soldiers in the hospital. 
 (PGDL3) Satisfied: the nurse believes that it is false that there are no soldiers in the 
  hospital.  
 
My evaluation: the nurse is not lying. 
 
The Host's utterance:  
 
(PGDL1) Satisfied: the host says that it was a pleasure to have the guest at the party 
 to the guest. 
(PGDL2) Not satisfied: the host does not communicatively-intend that the guest  
 believe that it was a pleasure to have the guest at the party. 
(PGDL3) Satisfied: the host believes that it is false that it was a pleasure to have the 
 guest at the party. 
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My evaluation: the host is not lying. 
 
I argue that (PGDL1) and (PGDL3) are satisfied, but (PGDL2) is not satisfied in any of the 
three cases, and so neither the witness, the nurse nor the host is lying. The central point is 
that (PGDL2) is not satisfied. That is, none of the speakers have actually asserted anything, 
because what they have said lacks assertoric force: communicative-intention. I conclude that 
bald-faced lies are not genuine lies, because they are not genuine assertions. Instead, the 
witness, the nurse and the host have only made-as-if-to assert a falsehood, and that is not 
sufficient for lying.11 Therefore, neither my Gricean definition of assertion, nor my 
preliminary Gricean definition of lying, should be rejected.  
 
3.8.1 Undermining the Intuition that Bald-Faced Lies Are Lies 
 
I understand and appreciate that some people have the intuition that bald-faced lies are 
genuine lies. I would like to offer an explanation as to why I think people have this intuition, 
and to undermine it accordingly. As mentioned above, Grice explains that participants of a 
conversation operate under a normative principle called the Co-operative Principle, as well 
as a set of Maxims. When a speaker lies, she fails to fulfil the Maxim of Quality. In addition, 
when a speaker bald-faced lies, she fails to fulfil the Maxim of Quality. That is, a genuine liar 
and a bald-faced liar each contravene a normative principle of co-operative communication. 
In this respect, bald-faced lies are very similar to genuine lies. However, the similarities stop 
here, since there are a number of ways by which the Maxims can fail to be fulfilled, as Grice 
explains: 
 
Violate 
 
He may quietly and unostentatiously violate a maxim in various ways; if so, in some 
cases he will be liable to mislead (Grice (1989: 30)). 
 
                                                          
11 'The only other philosopher that I know who has seen this option is Faulkner (forthcoming), whose 
view that bald-faced lies are not genuine lies because they lack communicative-intention, I discovered 
after I had formulated my own. 
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Clash 
 
He may be faced by a clash: He may be unable, for example, to fulfil the first maxim 
of Quantity (Be as informative as required) without violating the second maxim of 
Quality (Have adequate evidence for what you say) (Grice (1989: 30)). 
 
Opt Out 
 
He may opt out from the operation of both the maxim and the Cooperative Principle; 
he may say, indicate, or allow it to become plain that he is unwilling to cooperate in 
the way the maxim requires. He may say, for example, I cannot say more; my lips are 
sealed (Grice (1989: 30)). 
 
Flout 
 
He may flout a maxim; that is, he may blatantly fail to fulfil it (Grice (1989: 30)). 
 
Exploit 
 
On the assumption that the speaker is able to fulfil the maxim and to do so without 
violating another maxim (because of a clash), is not opting out, and is not, in view of 
the blatancy of his performance, trying to mislead, the hearer is faced with a minor 
problem: How can his saying what he did say be reconciled with the supposition that 
he is observing the overall Cooperative Principle? This situation is one that 
characteristically gives rise to conversational implicature; and when a conversational 
implicature is generated in this way, I shall say that a maxim is being exploited 
(Grice (1989: 30)). 
 
Lying is a violation of the Maxim of Quality, because in order to communicatively-intend 
the addressee to believe a falsehood, the speaker must do so quietly and unostentatiously, 
otherwise she cannot plausibly communicatively-intend for it to be believed. However, 
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bald-faced lying is a flouting of the Maxim of Quality, because in making-as-if-to assert a 
mutually-known falsehood, the speaker will have blatantly failed to fulfil it. In this respect, 
Bald-faced lies are more similar to sarcastic remarks, since they both flout the Maxim of 
Quality.12 However, the similarities, again, stop here, since in making sarcastic remarks, the 
speaker not only flouts the Maxims, but exploits them in order to implicate propositions, 
whereas the bald-faced liar does not. This shows a more fundamental distinction between 
genuine lies and sarcastic remarks compared to bald-faced lies: genuine lies and sarcastic 
remarks each involve communicative-intention, and so they each inform the addressee in 
way that bald-faced lies do not.  
 
I conclude that although bald-faced lies share some of the normative characteristics of 
genuine lies, since they lack assertoric force – communicative-intention – the intuition that 
they are genuine lies should be dropped.  
 
3.8.2 A Gricean Explanation of Bald-Faced Lies 
 
The Gricean account offers a framework to explain what is actually happening in the three 
cases of bald-faced lies discussed above. In the case of the nurse, she flouts the Maxim of 
Quality, because she wishes to opt out of the conversation. That is, she is faced with a 
situation in which she does not want to divulge information regarding her surroundings, 
but feels she must say enough in order to end the conversation, without giving honest 
answers. She does this by making-as-if-to assert a falsehood – she does not lie. In the case of 
the host, she flouts the Maxim of Quality, because she is faced with a clash between the 
Maxim of Quality and the more general Maxim of Politeness. That is, she is faced with a 
situation in which she feels that she should be polite, but should not say what she believes to 
be false to her guest. She decides to be polite by making-as-if-to assert a falsehood – she does 
not lie.13 In the case of the witness, she flouts the Maxim of Quality by giving a known-to-be 
false testimony. This case is particularly interesting, because it illustrates that my 
                                                          
12 In order to be sarcastic, it is not necessary to flout the Maxim of Quality. It is possible to be sarcastic 
by flouting other Maxims as well, like the Maxim of Relation, etc. 
13 Grice explains that there are all sorts of other Maxims, including aesthetic, social, and moral in 
character, including "Be polite." See Grice (1989: 28). 
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preliminary Gricean definition of lying runs in line with a pre-existing distinction between 
lying and perjury (See Mahon (2008)). Perjury (UK) is defined as follows:  
 
If any person lawfully sworn as a witness or as an interpreter in a judicial proceeding 
wilfully makes a statement material in that proceeding, which he knows to be false 
or does not believe to be true, he shall be guilty of perjury, and shall, on conviction 
thereof on indictment, be liable to penal servitude (Perjury Act: 1911. [1 & 2 GEO. 5. 
CH. 6.]).14 
 
When the witness testifies that she did not see the individual commit the crime, she lawfully 
swears in a judicial proceeding and wilfully makes a statement in that proceeding, which 
she knows (and is mutually known by everyone in attendance) to be false, and so she 
commits perjury. However, since what she says lacks assertoric force she makes-as-if-to 
assert a falsehood – she does not lie. Note, this shores up nicely with Hawley's remark, 
mentioned above, that maybe giving testimony has a more performative aspect (like saying 
'I do' during a wedding). Interestingly, it seems that all bald-faced lies have this aspect or a 
similar aspect to them, though the contexts, and so the surrounding conventions, may vary 
widely. That is, what the nurse says and what the host says seems somewhat performative, 
similar to, if not just like, phatic expressions. 
 
4 Lying with Implicatures 
 
4.1 Setting the Scene: Sorenson's Account 
 
Sorensen (2012) claims that nearly all definitions of lying have been developed from a one-
sided diet of examples: straight declaratives. He argues that this leaves us unprepared for 
lies involving indicative conditionals, because lies involving indicative conditionals are 
dependent on conditional probability, whereas lies involving straight declaratives are 
dependent on truth-value. He concludes that the connection between lying and falsehood is 
                                                          
14 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo5/1-2/6 
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broken when lying with indicative conditionals. My preliminary Gricean definition of lying, 
then, seems to be in danger of being rejected once again.  
 
Sorensen claims that all lies are assertions, and so defends an assertion-based definition of 
lying. However, he has not yet clearly presented his own assertion-based definition of lying. 
Nonetheless, he accepts the necessary conditions related to assertion: 
 
(i) Asserting entails saying (though not the converse). 
(ii) 'What is said' only consists of propositional content (i.e. truth-conditional 
content). 
 
Sorensen argues that you cannot lie using conversational implicatures, because conversational 
implicatures are not said, and so are not asserted. This, he claims, is because conversational 
implicatures are a pragmatic phenomenon. However, he argues that you can lie using 
conventional implicatures, because conventional implicatures are said, and so are asserted. 
This, he claims, is because conventional implicatures are a semantic phenomenon. He 
explains, as follows: 
 
Lying stands to misleading as conventional implicature stands to conversational 
implicature. A conversational implicature is inferred from the fact that p was uttered 
rather than from p itself (Sorensen (2012: 825)). 
 
Drawing on Jackson’s account of conditionals and Bach’s account of conventional 
implicatures, Sorensen argues that it is possible to lie by asserting believed-to-be true 
indicative conditional sentences by virtue of their believed-to-be false conventional 
implicatures. 
 
4.2 Jackson: Asserting Indicative Conditionals 
 
Jackson (1979) defends the Equivalence thesis: indicative conditionals are logically 
equivalent to material conditionals. However, he maintains that the standard explanation for 
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the assertability of indicative conditional sentences – assert the stronger rather than the 
weaker – is incorrect. He argues that indicative conditionals are logically equivalent to 
material conditionals, but, due to the conventional meaning of the term 'if, then,' indicative 
conditionals indicate that the material conditional is robust with respect to the antecedent, 
and so generate conventional implicatures. He explains that robustness is defined in terms of 
conditional probability, and so what governs the assertability of indicative conditionals is 
whether or not Probability(p) and Probability(p/q) are close, and both high. He concludes 
that if indicative conditionals are understood in this way, then the Equivalence thesis is 
secure.15 
 
4.2.1 The Indicative Conditional & the Material Conditional 
 
The indicative conditional, symbolised as 'p → q', is a natural language logical operator. It is 
characterised by natural language sentences of the form 'if p, then q'. The material 
conditional, symbolised as 'p ⊃ q', is a formal language logical operator. Equivalence 
theorists argue that indicative conditionals and material conditionals are logically equivalent 
(i.e. they have the same truth-conditions). The following truth-table shows that p ⊃ q is false 
if and only if p, the antecedent, is true and q, the consequent, is false. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15  There is a lot to be said about material conditionals and indicative conditionals. I intend only to 
give a simple overview of a fraction of the debate in order to discuss what matters for my purposes: 
the expectations concerning the use of indicative conditional sentences. 
p q p ⊃ q 
T T  T  
T F  F  
F T  T  
F F  T  
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4.2.3 The Equivalence Thesis 
 
The Equivalence Thesis is as follows:  
 
p → q is logically equivalent to p ⊃ q (i.e., the indicative conditional has the same 
truth-conditions as the material conditional). 
 
The standard argument for the Equivalence Thesis is as follows: 
 
p ⊃ q is logically equivalent to ~ p V q and  ~ p V q  is logically equivalent to p → q. 
Therefore, p → q is logically equivalent to p ⊃ q. 
 
Suppose that it is the case that if you drink poison, then you will die. This can be translated 
into disjunctive form: either it is not the case that you will drink poison or you will die. This 
shows that p ⊃ q and p → q are logically equivalent to  ~ p V q. Therefore, the indicative 
conditional and the material conditional are logically equivalent.  
 
4.2.4 Assertability & Probability 
 
Jackson explains that, as a rule, our intuitive judgements of whether it is appropriate to 
assert sentences or not matches up with our intuitive judgements of probability. That is, it is 
appropriate to assert indicative conditional sentence S if it has high subjective probability for 
its asserter.  So, when p ⊃ q is highly probable, but both ~p and q are not highly probable, it 
is appropriate to assert p → q (Jackson (1979: 565)). The conditional probability of p is the 
probability that q will occur given the knowledge that p has already occurred.16 Consider the 
following material conditional: 
 
(MC) It rains tomorrow ⊃ the match will be cancelled  
 
                                                          
16 See Adams (1965) for more on the definition of conditional probability. 
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Suppose that the material conditional is highly probable, but it is not highly probable that it 
is not the case that it will rain tomorrow and that the match will be cancelled. If this is the 
case, then it is appropriate to assert the following indicative conditional: 
 
(IC) If it rains tomorrow, then the match will be cancelled. 
 
The problem, however, is that if defenders of the Equivalence thesis follow this strategy, 
they are faced with counterexamples where, despite the high probability of either ~p or q, it 
is not appropriate to assert p → q.  
 
4.2.5 Paradox of Material Implication 
 
Consider the following: 
 
 ~p ∴ p → q 
 
p = The Earth is made of jelly beans. 
q = London is the capital of England. 
 
(PX) If the Earth is made of jelly beans, then London is the capital of England. 
 
The material conditional is true and highly probable, and it is highly probable that it is not 
the case that the Earth is made of jelly beans and it is highly probable that London is the 
capital of England. If assertability is governed by probability, then it is appropriate to assert 
(PX). This is counterintuitive.  
 
4.2.6 Assert the Stronger, Not the Weaker 
Jackson observes that the standard way for Equivalence theorists to explain away such 
counterexamples is to say that you should only assert the stronger sentence, not the weaker 
sentence. Suppose that Sx is logically stronger than Sy: Sx entails Sy, but Sy does not entail Sx. 
And suppose that Sx is nearly as highly probable as Sy. There is no significant loss of 
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probability in asserting Sx, and Sx must yield everything and more that Sy does. Therefore, Sx 
is to be asserted instead of Sy (Jackson (1979: 566)). In other words, the standard way that 
defenders of the Equivalence thesis explain away the inappropriateness of asserting p ⊃ q, 
when one of ~p or q is highly probable, is to say that you should simply assert either  ~p or 
q. 
 
4.2.7 A Reason for Sometimes Asserting the Weaker, Not the Stronger 
 
Jackson, however, explains why this account is insufficient. Suppose, again, that Sx is 
logically stronger than Sy, and that Sx's probability is only marginally lower than Sy's. It 
might be that the impact of new information, I, on Sx, is very different from the impact of I 
on Sy. That is, it might be that I reduces the probability of Sx substantially without reducing 
Sy's to any significant degree (in fact, Sy's may rise) (Jackson (1979: 569)). Jackson describes 
such situations as ones where Sy, but not Sx, is robust with respect to I (Jackson (1979: 570)). 
Consider the following example: 
 
Suppose I read in the paper that Hyperion won the 4.15. George asks me who won 
the 4.15. I say "Either Hyperion or Hydrogen won." Everyone agrees that I have done 
the wrong thing. Although the disjunction is highly probable, it is not highly 
assertable. Why? The standard explanation is in terms of "Assert the stronger instead 
of the weaker."' But is this the whole story? Consider the following modification to 
our case. What I read is that H– won. The name is too blurred for me to do more than 
pick out the initial letter. However I happen to know that Hyperion and Hydrogen 
are the only two horses in the 4.15 whose names begin with "H," and in addition I 
know that Hydrogen is a no-hoper from the bush. Clearly it is still the case that 
"Hyperion won" is highly probable and it would be quite proper for me to say so. But 
it would also be quite proper for me to say "Hyperion or Hydrogen won," despite its 
being weaker and only marginally more probable. Indeed the natural thing to do 
would be to say something like "Either Hyperion or Hydrogen won. It can't have 
been Hydrogen- he's a no-hoper. So it must have been Hyperion (Jackson (1979: 570 – 
571))." 
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Jackson argues that there is a marked change in the assertability of the disjunction in the first 
case compared to the second case, because in the first case if he were to learn that Hyperion 
was not the winner, he would have to abandon the disjunction. However, in the second case 
he would not. That is, in the first case Probability(Either Hyperion or Hydrogen 
won/Hyperion did not win) is low, whereas in the second case it is not. Therefore, in the 
second case there is point to asserting that Hyperion or Hydrogen won instead of simply 
that Hyperion won, even if the probabilities are very close (Jackson (1979: 571)). Jackson 
believes that this shows a gap in the Equivalence theorist's thought. Even if Sx and Sy are 
both highly probable and Sx entails everything Sy does, there might still be a good reason for 
asserting Sy, either instead of or as well as Sx. This is because it might be desirable that what 
you say should remain highly probable, should I turn out to be the case, and it might be that 
Probability(Sy/I) is high while Probability(Sx/I) is low. Robustness, then, in respect to I, might 
be desirable and (consistent with Sx entailing Sy) Sy might have it while Sx lacks it. Jackson 
concludes that robustness is an important ingredient in the assertability of indicative 
conditionals. 
 
4.2.8 Robustness Explained 
 
Jackson defines robustness for indicative conditionals as follows: an indicative conditional is 
robust if and only if you would not abandon your belief that p ⊃ q if you were to learn that p. 
That is, robustness is not satisfied if you believe p ⊃ q solely on the grounds that ~p, because 
if you find that p, you will abandon your belief in p ⊃ q rather than conclude that q. This 
amounts to you having a high probability for p⊃ q given p (i.e. having high probability for 
~p V q given p, which is to have a high probability for q given p) (Jackson (1979: 572)). The 
importance of signalling robustness with respect to the antecedent is to ensure that an 
assertable conditional is fit for modus ponens: 
 
p ⊃ q 
p 
∴ q 
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Jackson observes that although modus ponens is a valid formal argument, there is difficulty 
using it in practice. He explains that your evidence might make p ⊃ q highly probable, but 
you might not have any evidence for p. If q is of interest to you, then you might set about 
finding evidence for p, if you can. He maintains that the problem is that you might find 
evidence that makes p highly probable, but that might not be enough in itself for you to 
conclude q by modus ponens, which is because the evidence that makes p probable might 
make p ⊃ q improbable (Jackson (1979: 577)).17 Jackson argues, then, that you must 
distinguish the validity of modus ponens from its utility in a situation where you know p ⊃ 
q but do not know p. He concludes that the robustness of p ⊃ q relative to p is what is needed 
to ensure the utility of modus ponens in such situations. 
 
4.2.9 Indicative Conditionals & Conventional Implicatures 
 
Jackson argues that when you assert an indicative conditional, you are expected to have 
committed yourself to modus ponens inferences. Consider the following example from Lewis 
(1986): 
 
We are gathering mushrooms; I say to you "You won't eat that one and live." A dirty 
trick: I thought that one was safe and especially delicious, I wanted it myself, so I 
hoped to dissuade you from taking it without actually lying. I thought it highly 
probable that my trick would work, that you would not eat the mushroom, and 
therefore that I would turn out to have told the truth. But though what I said had a 
high subjective probability of truth, it had a low assertability and it was a misdeed to 
assert it. Its assertability goes not just by probability but by the resultant of that and a 
correction term to take account of the pointlessness and misleadingness of denying a 
conjunction when one believes it false predominantly because of disbelieving one 
conjunct (Lewis (1986: 152 – 153)). 
 
                                                          
17 Jackson actually presents two definitions of robustness: one in terms of probability and the other in 
terms of what is learned (evidence). Although this is an interesting distinction, it is not necessary to 
discuss it here. See Lewis (1986: 152 – 156). 
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Jackson explains that, in this case, when the speaker asserts the conjunction, "You won't eat 
that one and live," the addressee expects the conjunction to be robust with respect to "You 
eat that one," when it is not. That is, the addressee takes the speaker to be providing her with 
relevant information, and so constructs for herself the following piece of practical reasoning: 
 
(Prem1) I won't eat that one and live. (Premise supplied by speaker.) 
(Prem2) I eat that one. (Premise addressee can make true.)  
(Con) I won't live. 
 
The addressee is led to refrain from making (Prem2) true, because the conclusion is clearly 
undesirable. Jackson explains the reason why the addressee is tricked, as follows. The 
argument is valid, (Prem1) has a high probability, and the addressee is able to give (Prem2) 
a high probability. However, in order to infer the conclusion of a valid argument, all the 
premises need to be highly probable together. But, if the addressee were to make the second 
premise highly probable, (Prem1) would no longer be highly probable. The addressee, then, 
was entitled to take it that not only was "You won't eat that one and live" as highly probable, 
but that it was also robust with respect to "You eat that one" (Jackson (1979: 572 – 573)). 
 
What Lewis's example and Jackson's treatment of it bear out, is that robustness plays an 
important role in the assertability of sentences. Jackson explains that when speakers assert 
indicative conditionals, there is an expectation that the material conditional is robust with 
respect to the antecedent, and that this expectation is in place because conventions regarding 
the material conditional have become fixed due to the way indicative conditionals are 
generally used. He argues that it is specifically the syntactical constructions of indicative 
conditional sentences themselves that have come to conventionally indicate that the material 
conditional is robust with respect to the antecedent, and so, by exploiting the term 'if, then', 
speakers can generate conventional implicatures. Consider (S2) and (S3) again: 
 
(S2) She was poor but she was honest. 
(S3) She was poor and she was honest. 
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Grice explains that (S2) and (S3) are logically equivalent: (S2) is false if and only if at least 
one of its conjuncts is false, and (S3) is false if and only if at least one of its conjuncts is false. 
They are both true otherwise. However, if you assert (S2) instead of (S3), due to the term 
'but', you indicate that there is a contrast. That is, you do not say that there is a contrast. 
Thus, there are at least two separate, but related, aspects to asserting (S2): 
 
(i) What is said: 'p and q' 
(ii) What is indicated: there is a contrast. 
 
Now, consider (C1) and (C2): 
 
(C1) If you touch me, then I will scream. 
(C2) You touch me ⊃ I will scream. 
 
Jackson explains that (C1) and (C2) are logically equivalent: (C1) is false if and only if its 
antecedent is true and its consequent is false, and (C2) is false if and only if its antecedent is 
true and its consequent is false. They are both true otherwise. However, if you assert (C1) 
instead of (C2), due to the term 'if, then', you indicate that the material conditional is robust 
with respect to the antecedent. That is, you do not say that the material conditional is robust 
with respect to the antecedent. Thus, there are, again, at least two separate, but related, 
aspects to asserting (C1): 
 
(i) What is said: 'It is not the case that p and not q'18 
(ii) What is indicated:  p ⊃ q is robust with respect to p. 
 
The distinction that Jackson is making regarding (C1) is the same distinction that Grice is 
making regarding (S1). That is, in (C2), as in (S1), (i) is what is said (i.e. the propositional 
content), and so is asserted. Yet, in (C2), as in (S1), (ii) is not part of what is said (i.e. is not 
propositional content), and so is not asserted. Note, because (ii) in (S1) and (C2) is not 
                                                          
18 As we have seen, p ⊃ q  is logically equivalent to  ~ p V q . In addition, ~ p V q is logically equivalent 
to ~(p & ~q). Therefore, p ⊃ q  is logically equivalent to ~(p &~ q). For the sake of clarity I will refer to 
the propositional content of  p ⊃ q  in the following form: ~(p &~ q).  
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propositional in content, and so not truth-conditional, it does not affect the truth-conditions 
of the conjunction or the material conditional at base, respectively. 
 
Lewis's example and Jackson's treatment of it also help to highlight an important aspect of 
Sorensen's argument regarding the difference between deceiving with conversational 
implicatures and deceiving with conventional implicatures. "You won't eat that [mushroom] 
and live" is not an indicative conditional, it is a conjunction. The conjunction, then, does not 
contain the term 'if, then' in order to indicate robustness, and so does not generate a 
conventional implicature. Consider, though, the conjunction, "You won't eat that 
[mushroom] and live," in relation to the following indicative conditional, "If you eat that 
mushroom, then you will not live." Notice, the sentences are logically equivalent. That is, 
both sentences share exactly the same propositional content: 'it is not the case that you will 
eat that mushroom and live.' In addition, notice that they both indicate robustness. However, 
the crucial difference between the conjunction and the indicative conditional is that the 
conjunction indicates robustness due to the fact that it was uttered, and so generates a 
conversational implicature, whereas the indicative conditional indicates robustness due to the 
term 'if, then', and so generates a conventional implicature. As we have seen, Sorensen argues 
that you cannot lie using conversational implicatures, because conversational implicatures 
are not said, and so are not asserted. But, he argues that you can lie using conventional 
implicatures, because conventional implicatures are said, and so are asserted. He needs to 
show, then, that conventional implicatures are said in order for them to be eligible for 
assertion.  
 
4.3 Bach: The Myth of Conventional Implicature 
 
Bach (1999) claims that conventional implicatures are a myth. He argues that terms typified 
by 'but', 'still' and 'even' do in fact contribute to what is said (i.e. they are part of the 
propositional content of the sentences in which they are imbedded). Bach's IQ test is 
designed to prove that certain terms within uttered sentences do contribute to what is said, 
and to specify which terms within uttered sentences contribute to what is said. He concludes 
that the common assumption that uttered sentences, in which these terms are imbedded, 
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only consist of one proposition, is incorrect, and that such sentences actually consist of more 
than one proposition. In addition, he concludes that these ancillary propositions, though 
truth-conditional, are independent to the main proposition. 
 
4.3.1 Bach's Conventional Implicature Thesis 
 
Bach presents his own account of conventional implicatures using Grice's characterisation as 
a guide:  
 
A proposition is a conventional implicature of an utterance just in case (a) the 
speaker (speaking seriously) is committed to the truth of the proposition, (b) which 
proposition that is depends upon the (or a) conventional meaning of some particular 
linguistic device in the utterance, but (c) the falsity of that proposition is compatible 
with the truth of the utterance (Bach (1999: 331)). 
 
Bach calls expressions that supposedly generate conventional implicatures Alleged 
Conventional Implicature Devices (henceforth, ACIDS). 
 
4.3.2 The IQ Test 
 
Bach believes that there is a very simple problem with the CI-thesis. He observes that the CI-
thesis says that using certain expressions (or ACIDs), as a matter of their meaning, commits 
a speaker to a proposition that is not part of what is said. However, he argues that the 'that'-
clause of an indirect quotation specifies what is said in the utterance being reported, and 
ACIDs can occur in specifications of what is said (Bach (1999: 338 – 339)). Consider the IQ 
test: 
 
An element of a sentence contributes to what is said in an utterance of that sentence 
if and only if there can be an accurate and complete indirect quotation of the 
utterance (in the same language) which includes that element, or a corresponding 
element, in the 'that'-clause, that specifies what is said (Bach (1999: 340)). 
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Bach argues that the IQ test shows the true nature of the terms that are thought to generate 
conventional implicatures. He calls these particular ACIDs preservative operators. 
 
4.3.3 The Results of the IQ Test: Preservative Operators 
 
Imagine that Mr. X says (S5): 
 
(S5) Shaquille O' Neil is huge but he is agile.  
 
(a) Mr. X said that Shaquille O' Neil is huge but he is agile.  
(b) Mr. X said that Shaquille O' Neil is huge and he is agile.  
 
Bach argues that (S5a) is an accurate and complete indirect quotation of (S5), because (S5a) 
includes the element 'but' in the 'that'-clause, that specifies what is said. However, he argues 
that (S4b) is an inaccurate and incomplete indirect quotation of (S5), because (S5b) does not 
include the element 'but' in the 'that'-clause, that specifies what is said. He concludes that 
because (S5a) is an accurate and complete indirect quotation and (S5b) is an inaccurate and 
incomplete indirect quotation, the term 'but' in (S5) must contribute to what is said (i.e. must 
contribute to the propositional content of (S5)) (Bach (1999: 339)). Moreover, Bach argues 
that the IQ test shows that terms of this type are not detachable, as Grice claims them to be. 
(Grice claims that it is possible to replace utterance p, which generates conventional 
implicature c, with another utterance q, and say the same thing as p, and not generate 
conventional implicature c (Grice (1989: 30)).) Bach concludes that to use detachability as a 
test for the presence of a conventional implicature is to beg the question, because if a 
conventional implicature is part of what is said, you cannot leave it out and still say the 
same thing. 
 
Sorensen's view, then, is that the term 'if, then' is analogous to the term 'but'. That is, he 
considers the term 'if, then' to be a preservative operator whose content is propositional, and 
so contributes to the propositional content of the sentences in which it is imbedded. In other 
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words, Sorensen thinks that the contribution of 'if, then' is part of what is said. If he is right, 
then conventional implicatures might be eligible for assertion, and so it might be possible to 
lie by asserting believed-to-be true indicative conditionals by virtue of their believed-to-be 
false conventional implicatures on an assertion-based definition of lying.  
 
4.3.4 Expressing Multiple Propositions 
 
Bach claims that there is an insidious assumption that lies behind the CI-thesis: 
 
(OSOP) Every indicative sentence expresses exactly one proposition (Bach (1999: 
350)). 
 
He argues that if we reject this assumption, then we will no longer be forced to choose 
between treating the contribution of preservative operators as either an entailment, a 
conjunct or as not part of what is said (i.e. a conventional implicature). Instead, his view is 
that sentences that contain ACIDs, like ‘but’, comprise more than one proposition, that an 
ACID can be responsible for one of them, and that each proposition is independent of the 
other(s) (Bach (1999: 350 – 351)):  
 
Terms like ‘but’, ‘so’, ‘still’, and ‘even’ function as operators of a special sort. I call 
them preservative operators because in operating on a sentence (or phrase) to yield a 
new proposition, they preserve the original proposition. If, for example, ‘O’ is a 
unary preservative operator on sentences and expresses the property of being F, 
and ‘S’ expresses the proposition that p, then ‘O(S)’ expresses both the proposition 
that p and the proposition that F(p) (Bach (1999: 352)). 
 
Consider (S5) again: 
 
(S5) Shaquille O' Neil is huge but he is agile.  
 
Bach argues that due to the ACID 'but', (S5) comprises two propositions: 
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(i) Shaquille O' Neil is huge and he is agile.  
(ii) Being huge tends to preclude being agile.  
 
He concludes that primary proposition (i) and secondary proposition (ii) are part of what is 
said (Bach 2014: personal correspondence).  
 
4.4 Combining Jackson and Bach (and Potts) 
 
Sorensen adopts Jackson's account that indicative conditionals are logically equivalent to 
material conditionals, and that due to the conventional meaning of the term 'if, then' 
indicative conditionals indicate that the material conditional is robust with respect to the 
antecedent, and so generate conventional implicatures. That is, as we have seen, there are at 
least two separate, but related, aspects to asserting indicative conditionals: 
 
(i) What is said: 'It is not the case that p and not q' 
(ii) What is indicated: p ⊃ q is robust with respect to p 
  
However, Sorensen adopts Bach's account that sentences that contain terms thought to 
generate conventional implicatures express more than one proposition, and that the truth-
conditions of each proposition is independent of the other(s). In addition, Sorensen follows 
Potts (2003) – an advocate of Bach and his IQ test – in the view that if sentences that contain 
terms thought to generate conventional implicatures do express more than one proposition, 
and that the terms themselves are responsible for one of those propositions, then each 
proposition that is expressed by that sentence is asserted. Sorensen's view, then, is that when 
an indicative conditional is asserted, two propositions are asserted simultaneously: 
 
(i) What is said: 'It is not the case that p and not q'. (Primary proposition.) 
(ii) What is said: 'p ⊃ q is robust with respect to p'. (Secondary proposition/conventional 
implicature.) 
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4.5 The Doctor 
 
A doctor is visited by a patient who is well-known among the local medical community as a 
hypochondriac. The patient tells the doctor that he believes that he has a fatal illness. The 
doctor makes the necessary checks to determine whether the patient has a fatal illness or not. 
She finds that he does not, and so will live. However, the doctor believes that the patient will 
not listen to reason, and that he will not leave her office unless he is given what he believes 
to be some form of medication to save him from what he believes to be a fatal illness. So, the 
doctor gives the patient some placebos and asserts the following: 
 
(S6) If you take these tablets, then you will live. 
 
Sorensen explains that when the doctor makes her assertion to the patient, the following 
happens: 
 
(i) The doctor asserts the believed-to-be true primary proposition, 'it is not the case that 
you take these tablets and you will not live'. 
(ii) The doctor asserts the believed-to-be false secondary proposition/conventional 
implicature, ''you take these tablets ⊃ you will live' is robust with respect to 'you take 
these tablets''. 
(iii) The doctor intends to deceive the patient into believing that the believed-to-be false 
secondary proposition/conventional implicature is true.  
 
Sorensen concludes that examples such as this show that it is possible to lie by asserting a 
believed-to-be true indicative conditional sentence with a believed-to-be false secondary 
proposition/conventional implicature. In addition, he concludes that since Jackson's notion 
of robustness is defined in terms of conditional probability, rather than truth-value, the 
connection between lying and falsehood is broken (Sorensen (2012: 824)). My preliminary 
Gricean definition of lying, then, seems to be in danger once again.  
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4.6 The Shortcomings of Sorensen's Account 
 
Fallis (2012b) points out an obvious problem with Sorensen's account of lying with believed-
to-be true indicative conditionals by virtue of their believed-to-be false conventional 
implicatures. If the doctor asserts (S6), then, according to Sorensen, she asserts what she 
believes to be a true primary proposition (i.e. 'it is not the case that you take these tablets 
and you will not live') and she simultaneously asserts what she believes to be a false 
secondary proposition/conventional implicature (i.e. ''you take these tablets ⊃ you will live' 
is robust with respect to 'you take these tablets''). The fact, then, that Jackson defines 
robustness in terms of conditional probability is redundant, because although its truth-
conditions are derived from conditional probability, on Sorensen's account, the secondary 
proposition/conventional implicature, due to being truth-conditional, is simply either true or 
false, and so simply believed to be true or believed to be false, regardless. In other words, on 
Sorensen's account, lying with believed-to-be true indicative conditional sentences by virtue 
of their believed-to-be false conventional implicatures does not break the connection 
between lying and falsehood, and so is no different from lying with standard declarative 
sentences. Therefore, my preliminary Gricean definition of lying is not in danger after all. 
 
4.7 My Beef With Bach 
 
4.7.1 The Problem with the IQ Test 
 
Bach claims that the IQ test proves that certain elements of an uttered sentence contribute to 
what is said (i.e. contribute to the propositional content). In addition, he claims that it 
specifies which elements of an uttered sentence contribute to what is said. Consider the IQ 
test again: 
 
An element of a sentence contributes to what is said in an utterance of that sentence 
if and only if there can be an accurate and complete indirect quotation of the 
utterance (in the same language) which includes that element, or a corresponding 
element, in the 'that'-clause, that specifies what is said (Bach (1999: 340)). 
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Bach argues that an indirect quotation of an uttered sentence which does not include the 
element, or a corresponding element, in the 'that'-clause, that contributes to what is said, is 
an inaccurate and incomplete indirect quotation, and therefore, does not specify what is 
said. However, this raises the following question: if you do not already know whether or not 
the element in the uttered sentence contributes to what is said, how can you know whether 
or not the indirect quotation is accurate and complete when the element, or corresponding 
element, is not included? The answer is: you cannot know, because you first need to know 
whether or not the element in the uttered sentence contributes to what is said in order to 
know whether or not the indirect quotation is accurate and complete when the element, or a 
corresponding element, is not included. Consider the example of Mr. X saying (S5) again: 
 
(S5) Shaquille O' Neil is huge but he is agile.  
 
(a) Mr. X said that Shaquille O' Neil is huge but he is agile.  
(b) Mr. X said that Shaquille O' Neil is huge and he is agile.  
 
Bach argues that (S5a) is an accurate and complete indirect quotation of (S5), because (S5a) 
includes the element 'but' in the 'that'-clause, and therefore, specifies what is said in (S5). 
However, he argues that (S5b) is an inaccurate and incomplete indirect quotation of (S5), 
because (S5b) does not include the element 'but' in the 'that'-clause, and therefore, does not 
specify what is said in (S5). He concludes that 'but' does contribute to what is said in uttered 
sentences. The problem is that the IQ test can only prove that (S5b) is an inaccurate and 
incomplete indirect quotation of (S5) if we already know whether or not 'but' contributes to 
what is said in (S5). Yet, that is exactly what the IQ test is designed to prove. In other words, 
the IQ test begs the question. 
 
In addition, as mentioned above, Bach argues that using detachability as a test for the 
presence of a conventional implicature is to beg the question, because if a conventional 
implicature is part of what is said, then you could not leave it out and still say the same 
thing. Ironically, in trying to show this, Bach begs the question himself. 
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I conclude that because the IQ test begs the question, it is an invalid test, and so does not 
prove whether or not any term contributes to what is said. 
 
4.7.2 The Problem with Bach's Construal  
 
Grice clearly explains that conventional implicatures do not contribute to what is said in 
asserted sentences, and so do not contribute to the propositional content of asserted 
sentences: 
 
U’s doing x might be his uttering the sentence “She was poor but she was honest”. 
What U meant, and what the sentence means, will both contain something 
contributed by the word “but”, and I do not want this contribution to appear in an 
account of what (in my favoured sense) U said (but rather as a conventional implicature) 
(Grice (1989: 88) – my italics). 
 
The problem is that Bach misconstrues Grice's characterisation, and so confuses the three 
separate, but related, aspects of asserted sentences that contain terms like 'but', which 
generate conventional implicatures, for just two:  
 
(i) The propositional content of the asserted sentence. 
(ii) The conventionally fixed operational content of the term within the asserted 
sentence. 
(iii) The implicated proposition that is independent of the asserted sentence (i.e. the 
conventional implicature itself). 
 
I conclude that Bach's construal of conventional implicature is not true to Grice's 
characterisation, and that a better account of conventional implicature should be adopted.   
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4.8 Conventional Implicatures Explained 
 
Consider (S4) and (S4a): 
 
(S4) I've had three bowls of porridge but I'm still hungry. 
(S4a) I've had three bowls of porridge and I'm still hungry. 
 
Grice explains that (S4) and (S4a) are logically equivalent : (S4) is false if and only if at least 
one of its conjuncts is false, and (S4a) is false if and only if at least one of its conjuncts is 
false. They are both true otherwise. This is because (S4) and (S4a) consist of exactly the same 
propositional content. That is, they both express the single conjunctive proposition, 'I've had 
three bowls of porridge and I'm still hungry.' The difference between (S4) and (S4a) is that 
(S4), as well as expressing the same conjunctive proposition as (S4a), contains the term 'but', 
and the term 'but' consists of conventionally fixed content. However, this conventionally 
fixed content is not propositional content. Instead, it is what I shall call operational content. 
Therefore, the term 'but' does not contribute to what is said in (S4) (Bourne (2014: personal 
correspondence)). Specifically, the term 'but' performs the operation of indicating that there 
is a contrast. A speaker is able, then, to exploit the conventionally fixed operational content 
of the term 'but', in order to implicate a proposition that is independent of (S4). It is 
important to understand that when a speaker exploits the term 'but', she determines the 
specific proposition that she communicatively-intends the addressee to believe, although the 
potential propositions that she can implicate by exploiting the term 'but' are indefinite. For 
example, as explained earlier, if a speaker asserts (S4), by exploiting the term 'but', she might 
implicate the following proposition: 
 
(S4I) I'm surprised that I'm hungry after eating so much. 
 
Note, since the term 'but' consists of conventionally fixed operational content, rather than 
propositional content, and since conventionally implicated propositions are independent of 
asserted sentences, if you indirectly quote somebody who has asserted, for example, (S4), 
and you replace the term 'but' in (S4) for the term 'and', your indirect quotation will be 
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accurate and complete, because you will have said exactly what they said. This, then, is a 
clear example of why/how conventional implicatures are detachable, as Grice claims. We can 
now see what the three separate, but related, aspects of (S4) are and how they work: 
 
(i) The propositional content of the sentence: 'I've had three helpings of porridge 
and I'm still hungry'. 
(ii) The conventionally fixed operational content of the term 'but' indicates that there 
is a contrast. 
(iii) The implicated proposition generated by exploiting 'but': 'I'm surprised that I'm 
still hungry after eating so much'. 
 
Jackson argues, as we have seen, that the term 'if, then' is analogous to the term 'but'. 
Consider (C1) and (C2), again: 
 
(C1) If you touch me, then I will scream. 
(C2) You touch me ⊃ I will scream. 
 
Again, (C1) and (C2) are logically equivalent : (C1) is false if and only if its antecedent is true 
and its consequent is false, and (C2) is false if and only if its antecedent is true and its 
consequent is false. They are both true otherwise. This is because (C1) and (C2) consist of 
exactly the same propositional content. That is, they both express the single proposition, 'It is 
not the case that you will touch me and I will not scream'. The difference between (C1) and 
(C1) is that (C1), as well as expressing the same proposition as (C2), contains the term 'if, 
then', and the term 'if, then' itself consists of conventionally fixed content. However, this 
conventionally fixed content is not propositional content. Instead, as we have seen, it is 
operational content. Therefore, the term 'if, then' does not contribute to what is said in (C1). 
Specifically, the term 'if, then' performs the operation of indicating that the material 
conditional is robust with respect to the antecedent. A speaker is able, then, to exploit the 
conventionally fixed operational content of the term 'if, then' in order to implicate a 
proposition that is independent of (C1). Again, it is important to understand that when a 
speaker exploits the term 'if, then', she determines a specific proposition that she 
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communicatively-intends the addressee to believe, although the potential propositions that 
she can implicate by exploiting the term 'if, then' are indefinite. For example, if a speaker 
asserts (C1), by exploiting the term 'if, then', she might implicate the following proposition: 
 
(C1I) Touching me will cause me to scream. 
 
I conclude that Bach's account of conventional implicature should be rejected and that this 
account should be adopted. In addition, I conclude that by understanding the terms that 
generate conventional implicatures, as well as the conventional implicatures themselves, as I 
have presented them here, it is clear that neither are part of what is said, and so neither are 
eligible for assertion. Sorensen's account of indicative conditionals, then, should also be 
rejected.  
 
4.9 Revisiting the Doctor 
 
We are now in a position to revisit the doctor example to see exactly what happens when a 
speaker deceives an addressee by asserting a believed-to-be true indicative conditional 
sentence by virtue of its believed-to-be false conventional implicature. Consider (S6) again: 
 
(S6) If you take these tablets, then you will live. 
 
On my account, when the doctor makes her assertion to the patient, the following happens: 
 
(i) The doctor asserts the believed-to-be true proposition, 'It is not the case that you take 
these tablets and you will not live'. 
(ii) The conventionally fixed operational content of the term 'if, then' indicates that the 
material conditional is robust with respect to the antecedent. 
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(iii) The doctor exploits the conventionally fixed operational content of the term 'if, then' 
to implicate the believed-to-be false proposition, 'Taking these tablets will cause you 
to live'.19 
 
I consider this to be a case of lying by asserting a believed-to-be true indicative conditional 
by virtue of its believed-to-be false conventional implicature. However, my preliminary 
Gricean definition of lying does not rule-in the doctor's assertion as a lie, because it is the 
conventionally implicated proposition that does the deceptive work, not the asserted 
proposition.  I conclude that my preliminary Gricean definition of lying needs adjusting.20 
 
4.10 Lying with All Implicatures 
 
Many philosophers (Adler (1997); Carson (2006); Fallis (2009); Saul (2012); Sorensen (2012); 
Stokke (2013)) argue that you cannot lie using all (or any) implicatures, because it is the 
proposition that is said that is the crucial aspect of lying. I think that this is misguided. I 
appreciate that the mechanics of asserting are different from the mechanics of implicating. 
However, I also understand that there is a key component that both assertions and 
implicatures share: communicative-intention. My suggestion, then, is that it is the 
proposition that is communicatively-intended  to be believed that is the crucial aspect of 
lying. Therefore, since all implicatures, as well as assertions, deal in communicative-
intention, all are sufficient for lying.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 Remember, implicating a proposition, whether conventionally or conversationally, is a 
communicatively-intentional act. Therefore, by implicating a believed-to-be false proposition, a 
speaker will have attempted deception. 
20 Sorensen makes the following observation: "if it were impossible to lie with conditionals, then all 
lying could be prevented by translating everything into universalised implications of the form ‘For all 
x, if. .. then …’" (Sorensen (2012: 821)). Interestingly, if Sorensen sticks with his view, instead of 
adopting mine, then he will be in danger of fulfilling  G. C. Lichtenburg’s fantasy: ‘I often wished that 
there would be a language in which it were impossible to tell a lie.’  
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4.10.1 Lying with Conversational Implicatures 
 
Mr. X and Mrs. Y have had a serious falling out. In addition, they have both been invited to 
Mrs. Z's party. Mrs. Y will go to the party, but only if Mr. X is not going. Unknown to Mrs. 
Y, Mr. X, who is sick with a cold, is going to the party, nonetheless. Mrs. Y talks to Mrs. Z 
about her predicament. However, Mrs. Z has already spoken to Mr. X, and so she knows 
that he is sick, but that he is going to the party. Moreover, Mrs. Z thinks that it would be best 
for Mr. X and Mrs. Y to meet at the party in order to sort out their problems. When Mrs. Y 
asks Mrs. Z if Mr. X is going to the party or not, Mrs. Z asserts the following: 
 
Mrs. Z: Mr. X is sick. 
 
In asserting something true (i.e. that Mr. X is sick), Mrs. Z exploits the Maxim of Relation 
(specifically, 'Be relevant'), indicating that she is communicating something over and above 
what she asserted. What she implicated is as follows: 
 
(IP1) Mr. X is not going to the party.  
 
Since Mrs. Z believes that it is false that Mr. X is not going to party, she has attempted to 
deceive Mrs. Y. In my view, she has lied.  
 
4.10. 2 Lying with Conventional Implicatures 
 
Mr. X wants to buy the car that Mrs. Y is selling. However, Mr. X is not willing to pay the 
amount that Mrs. Y is asking for, even though the car fits his exact specifications and is his 
favourite colour: Burlesque Pink. Mr. X knows that Mrs. Y has had difficulty selling the car 
because of its colour, and Mrs. Y has no idea what Mr. X's favourite colour is. When Mr. X 
goes to view the car, in an attempt to drive the price down, he asserts the following: 
 
Mr. X: The car fulfils my exact specifications but it is Burlesque Pink. 
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In asserting something true (i.e. that the car fulfils his exact specifications and is Burlesque 
Pink), Mr. X exploits the conventional meaning of the term 'but' (specifically, that there is a 
contrast), indicating that he is communicating something over and above what he has 
asserted. What he implicated is as follows: 
 
(IP2) I [Mr. X] do not like the colour Burlesque Pink. 
 
Since Mr. X believes that it is false that he does not like the colour Burlesque Pink, he has 
attempted to deceive Mrs. Y. In my view, he has lied.21  
 
4.10.3 Lying with Scalar Implicatures 
 
Mr. X has cooked an apple crumble for Mrs. X and the children. He proudly takes it out of 
the oven, puts it to one side, and then leaves the kitchen. Moments after, Mrs. X walks into 
the kitchen and sees Mr. X's apple crumble. Mrs. X decides that she will have some of it. 
However, Mrs. X finds the apple crumble so delicious that she ends up eating all of it, and 
then leaves the Kitchen to go and play with the children. Mr. X returns to the kitchen and 
notices that his apple crumble has gone. He walks out into the garden where Mrs. X and the 
children are playing and asks Mrs. X what happened to his apple crumble. Mrs. X sees that 
the children are out of hearing distance, and then she asserts: 
 
 Mrs. X: I ate some of the apple crumble.  
 
In asserting something true (i.e. that she ate some of the pie), Mrs. X violates the Maxim of 
Quantity (specifically, 'Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current 
purposes of the exchange)'), indicating that she is communicating something over and above 
what she asserted. What she implicated is as follows: 
 
(IP3) I [Mrs. X] did not eat all of the apple crumble.  
                                                          
21 I have already shown how lying with the conventional implicatures generated by 'if, then' operate, 
above.  
80 
 
 
Since Mrs. X believes that it is false that she did not eat all of the apple crumble, she has 
attempted to deceive Mr. X. In my view, she has lied.  
 
4.11 My Final Gricean Definition of Lying 
 
I think that it is possible to lie with all implicatures, as well as assertions, and so I wish to 
make an adjustment to my preliminary Gricean definition of lying. I will use the word 
'inform' as a technical umbrella term to capture the acts of asserting and implicating, as I 
think the notion of informing can plausibly be construed in a broad enough sense to capture 
the notion of communicative-intentions, but in a narrow enough sense to restrict that to only 
cases of asserting and implicating. I present the final formulation of my Gricean definition of 
lying: 
 (GDL) A lies to B iff A informs B that p and A believes that p is false. 
Grice explains that although the Co-operative Principle, and so the Maxims, may be 
contravened or unfulfilled, respectively, at the level of what is said, the addressee is entitled 
to presume that the Co-operative Principle, and so the Maxims, are observed at the level of 
what is implicated (1989: 33). We can see, then, that lies involving implicatures, as well as 
lies involving assertions, will be a violation of the Maxim of Quality. 
 
4.12 A Web of Lies 
 
By understanding conversational, conventional and scalar implicatures as they are 
presented here, we have the potential to explain how different types of sarcasm and more 
complex cases, such as metaphor and figurative speech, operate. Second, since we have the 
potential to explain how these phenomena operate, we then have the potential to explain 
how more interesting cases of lying involving such phenomena operate. I will be researching 
this in the future. 
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5 Conclusion 
In this thesis I have presented my own Gricean definition of assertion and my own Gricean 
definition of lying. What lies at the heart of each of these definitions is Grice's notion of 
communicative-intention. I have argued that if we focus on what speakers communicatively-
intend addressees to believe, rather than what speakers say to addressees, then we need not 
class bald-faced lies as genuine lies, and we can class deceptive implicatures as genuine lies. 
In doing so, we are left with a simpler picture of lying that offers ethical and legal theorists 
something to hang their hats on. 
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